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1  Introduction
“Human dignity” has become an integral part of the vocabulary of com-
parative constitutionalism. Not only is the right to dignity proclaimed in 
national constitutions and international human rights instruments, but it is 
asserted with increasing frequency that dignity is the basis of all human rights 
and should be used as a guide to their interpretation.1 Dignity is invoked as 
a supreme value, an interpretive Leitmotiv, a basis for the limitation of rights 
and freedoms, and a guide to the principled resolution of constitutional value 
conflicts. In the view of some authors, dignity provides judicial review with 
a secure and legitimate basis. Consider, for instance, the claim made by a 
German law professor that dignity is the only absolute value in a world of 
relative values – a fixed star which provides orientation amidst life’s uncertain-
ties.2 Consider, too, the contention of a judge of South Africa’s Constitutional 
Court that dignity “is an indispensable constituent in neutrally principled and 
correct adjudication on issues of unfair discrimination”.3
And yet, dignity is a contested concept. Sometimes, the transnational 
consensus on the importance of dignity appears to be a function of the high 
level of generality at which it is formulated. Behind the agreement on abstract 
notions of the inviolability of the dignity and worth of the human person 
lurks disagreement over the scope and meaning of dignity, its philosophical 
foundations, and its capacity to guide the interpretation of human rights and 
to constrain judicial decision-making. Alongside the conviction that dignity 
places constitutional interpretation on a secure footing exists the opposite view 
– that a dignity-based jurisprudence is the antithesis of principled decision-
making, because it allows judges to resort to (subjective) values rather than 
*  This article originated, and substantial parts of it were written, during a research visit to Germany 
in 2007  I am grateful to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for financial support, to Professor 
Peter Häberle at the University of Bayreuth for his guidance and hospitality, and to the directors of the 
Max Planck Institute for International and Comparative Law in Heidelberg for allowing me to use the 
Institute’s excellent facilities  Thanks also to Erin Nel and Heiko Braun for research assistance, to Laurie 
Ackermann and Lourens du Plessis for valuable advice, and to two anonymous referees for comments and 
suggestions  Remaining errors are my own
1 See the references under 2 below  See also Weinrib “Constitutional Conceptions and Constitutional 
Comparativism” in Jackson & Tushnet (eds) Defining the Field of Comparative Constitutional Law 
(2002) 3 on the primacy of human dignity in the “postwar constitutional conception”
2 Isensee “Menschenwürde: die säkulare Gesellschaft auf der Suche nach dem Absoluten” 2006 AöR 173 
175, 217
3 Ackermann “Equality and the South African Constitution: the Role of Dignity” 2000 Heidelberg Journal 
of International Law 537 556
       
(objective) rules,4 or because “dignity” has such a wide range of meanings that 
it can be invoked in defence of multiple, often directly conflicting, outcomes 
and presuppositions.5
South Africa is one of the countries which have recently embraced dignity 
as a constitutional right, a supreme value and a guide to constitutional inter-
pretation. The dignity-based jurisprudence of South Africa’s Constitutional 
Court has sparked a lively debate on dignity’s relationship to other values 
(particularly equality) and the capacity of dignity to constrain constitutional 
decision-making. Implicit in these debates are also questions about the vari-
ous dimensions of dignity, its scope and meaning, and its role in balancing and 
proportionality analysis.
What is missing from the South African literature on dignity is a sus-
tained engagement with comparative constitutional law. So far, South 
African constitutional scholars have largely failed to situate their analyses 
and critiques of the Court’s dignity-based jurisprudence within the broader 
context of a transnational constitutional discourse on human dignity. This 
is surprising for a number of reasons. First, human dignity is central to 
the constitutions of many countries which have, over the past 60 years, 
emerged from dictatorship, oppression, totalitarianism, fascism, colonial-
ism and discrimination. Secondly, section 10 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”), which enshrines the 
right to human dignity, closely resembles the provisions of some of these 
constitutions. Thirdly, it is highly likely that the Constitutional Court’s 
understanding of dignity as the most fundamental norm contained in the 
Constitution has been shaped, at least to some extent, by comparative case 
law and literature.6 And fourthly, foreign case law and academic literature 
offer rich resources for the conceptualization, analysis and critique of a 
dignity-based approach.
From the perspective of South African constitutional law, a comparative 
study of constitutional dignity clauses and of their judicial elaboration offers 
a number of advantages.7 First, it is likely to give us a better sense not only 
4 In the words of Judge Easterbrook of the United States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals: “[w]hen we 
observe that the Constitution stands for ‘human dignity’ but not rules, we have destroyed the basis for 
judicial review” (“Approaches to Judicial Review” in Politics and the Constitution: the Nature and Extent 
of Interpretation (1990) 29, cited by Berger “Justice Brennan, ‘Human Dignity’, and Constitutional 
Interpretation” in Meyer & Parent The Constitution of Rights: Human Dignity and American Values 
(1992) 130 n 2)
5 Cf the remark made by Dennis Davis, a South African law professor and judge, that South Africa’s 
Constitutional Court “has given dignity both a content and a scope that make for a piece of jurisprudential 
Legoland – to be used in whatever form and shape is required by the demands of the judicial designer” 
(“Equality: The Majesty of Legoland Jurisprudence” 1999 SALJ 398 413)
6 On the use made by the Constitutional Court of comparative materials, see Ackermann “Constitutional 
Comparativism in South Africa: a Response to Sir Basil Markesinis and Jörg Fedtke” 2005 (80) Tulane 
LR 169; Botha “Comparative Law and Constitutional Adjudication: a South African Perspective” 2007 
Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 569
7 On the possibilities of constitutional comparativism within a South African context, see Ackermann 
2000 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 556; Botha 2007 Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der 
Gegenwart 578-587; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses: a Comparative Analysis (1999) 1-8
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of the similarities between South Africa’s dignity jurisprudence and that of 
foreign jurisdictions, but also of the paths not taken: the textual formulations 
and interpretations that have – whether consciously or not – been avoided by 
the Constitutional Assembly and/or judiciary. Secondly, a comparative study 
should alert us to the historical contingency of the constitutional choices 
that have been made, and to the existence of other interpretive possibilities 
which may or may not make better sense of the commitments enshrined in 
the Constitution. Thirdly, a comparative approach should give us a better idea 
of the extent to which problems associated with a dignity-based approach are 
inherent in the notion of dignity, or are the result of a particular textual formu-
lation or judicial interpretation.
This article analyses and compares the role of dignity in the interpretation of 
the fundamental rights provisions in the constitutions of Germany and South 
Africa respectively. The choice of Germany for the purpose of comparison 
should come as no surprise. The scope and sophistication of the dignity jurispru-
dence of German courts – in particular the Federal Constitutional Court – and 
the depth of academic comment by German constitutional law scholars on the 
concept and uses of dignity are unparalleled in any other country. In addition, 
South Africa’s Constitutional Court has acknowledged the relevance of German 
jurisprudence to the interpretation of the “core values of human dignity, equality 
and freedom”. In the words of Ackermann J in a concurring judgment in Du 
Plessis v De Klerk:8
“I do believe that the German Basic Law was conceived in dire circumstances bearing sufficient 
resemblance to our own to make critical study and cautious application of its lessons to our situation 
and Constitution warranted. The GBL was no less powerful a response to totalitarianism, the degrada-
tion of human dignity and the denial of freedom and equality than our Constitution. Few things make 
this clearer than Art 1(1) of the GBL, particularly when it is borne in mind that the principles laid 
down in Art 1 are entrenched against amendment of any kind by Art 79(3).”9
Section 2 situates the comparison of the dignity jurisprudence of German 
and South African courts within a broader analysis of the role of dignity in 
international human rights instruments and national constitutions. The posi-
tion in Germany is dealt with in section 3. The focus then shifts to South 
Africa in section 4. Section 5 contains some theoretical conclusions about the 
possibilities and limits of a dignity-based constitutional jurisprudence. It is 
suggested that it is precisely the paradoxical nature of human dignity which 
enables it to guide and structure constitutional discourse.
8 1996 3 SA 850 (CC)
9 Para 92  While it is safe to assume that the dignity-based jurisprudence of South Africa’s Constitutional 
Court has, at least in part, been inspired and influenced by German constitutional jurisprudence, it is 
not clear from the Court’s judgments exactly what it takes the relevant textual, contextual, cultural and 
historical similarities and differences between Germany and South Africa to be  It is also not immediately 
apparent to what extent the Court understands its dignity-based interpretation of specific rights such as 
the right to equality, or its use of dignity in assessments based on balancing and proportionality to have 
been modelled on German constitutional law, or as a new departure  It is only through careful textual 
exegesis and a juxtaposition of the German and South African literature that the comparativist can arrive 
at some tentative conclusions
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2  International and comparative law
2 1  International human rights instruments
The inherent dignity of every human person, the trauma caused by past 
massive violations of human dignity and the wish to prevent the reoccurrence 
of such violations are recurring themes in international human rights instru-
ments.10 The preamble to the Charter of the United Nations (1945) declares the 
determination of the international community “to reaffirm faith in fundamen-
tal human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person [and] in the 
equal rights of men and women”. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948) states in its preamble that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the 
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the founda-
tion of freedom, justice and peace in the world”, and declares in Article 1 that 
“[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” Moreover, 
both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) pro-
claim in their preambles that human rights “derive from the inherent dignity 
of the human person”.
Dignity is sometimes formulated as an individual right.11 On other occa-
sions, it features as a founding value which underlies and legitimates the 
international protection of human rights.12 Dignity is frequently referred to 
in conjunction with other values, such as equality and freedom. For instance, 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000) declares in 
its preamble that “the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of 
human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity”. It is also invoked within the 
context of socio-economic rights, grounding the notion that the state is obliged 
to ensure conditions which are consistent with basic human dignity.13
References to dignity are also common in treaties proscribing discrimi-
nation and/or seeking to protect vulnerable groups.14 The United Nations 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1963) 
10 The obligation to respect human dignity is also entrenched in international humanitarian law  Art 3(1)(c), 
which is common to all four Geneva Conventions of 1949, prohibits “outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular humiliating and degrading treatment” (see eg the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field)
11 Art 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) provides: “[e]very individual shall have 
the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being ” Cf also Art 10(1) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with 
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”); Art 13(1) of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the right to an education that is “directed to the 
full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity”); Art 31(1) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000) (“[e]very worker has the right to working conditions 
which respect his or her health, safety and dignity”)
12 Cf the references in the main text above to the preambles of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)  
See also Dicke “The Founding Function of Human Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” 
in Kretzmer & Klein (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 111
13 Eg Art 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that everyone is entitled to the realization 
of the economic, social and cultural rights “indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his 
personality”, while Art 23(3) recognizes the right to remuneration which ensures “an existence worthy of 
human dignity”
14 See also Principle 2 of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959)
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states in Article 1 that “[d]iscrimination between human beings on the ground 
of race, colour or ethnic origin is an offence to human dignity”. Similarly, 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (1979) recalls in its preface that “discrimination against women 
violates the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity”. 
Article 3 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003) goes even further in recognizing the 
link between human dignity and gender equality. It provides:
“1.  Every woman shall have the right to dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition and 
protection of her human and legal rights;
2.  Every woman shall have the right to respect as a person and to the free development of her 
personality;
3.  States parties shall adopt and implement appropriate measures to prohibit any exploitation or 
degradation of women;
4.  States parties shall adopt and implement appropriate measures to ensure the protection of every 
woman’s right to respect for her dignity and protection of women from all forms of violence, 
particularly sexual and verbal violence.”
International courts and tribunals have also relied on dignity in their inter-
pretation of human rights instruments. Even though the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) con-
tains no express reference to dignity, the European Court of Human Rights 
and the Commission of Human Rights have invoked the dignity of the human 
person in a variety of contexts, including torture, the rights of prisoners, and 
sexual orientation.15
2 2  Comparative constitutional dignity clauses
Human dignity is central to many of the national constitutions adopted over 
the past sixty years.16 This is particularly the case in countries emerging from 
authoritarian, oppressive, colonial and/or racist pasts. The German Basic Law 
of 1949 (“the Basic Law”), and the Constitutions of Greece (1975), Portugal 
(1976), Spain (1978), Namibia (1990), the Russian Federation (1993), South 
Africa (1993 and 1996) and Poland (1997) all invoke the fundamental dignity 
of the human person in signalling a break with the past and in seeking to 
prevent a reoccurrence of past horrors.17 In many constitutions, dignity is 
entrenched as an individual right.18 The formulation of Article 1(1) of the 
15 See Frowein “Human Dignity in International Law” in Kretzmer & Klein (eds) The Concept of Human 
Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 121
16 See generally Häberle “Die Menschenwürde als Grundlage der staatlichen Gemeinschaft” in Isensee & 
Kirchhof (eds) Handbuch des Staatsrechts 3 ed (2004) 317 321-323  Interesting developments have also 
taken place at the sub-national level  See Häberle‘s discussion of the dignity jurisprudence of the consti-
tutional courts in Bavaria and Hesse (328-331)  See also Jackson “Constitutional Dialogue and Human 
Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional Discourse” 2004 Montana LR 15 for a discussion of the 
dignity clauses contained in the state constitutions of Montana and Puerto Rico
17 However, not all constitutional dignity clauses are a direct response to past trauma – see eg Art 7 of the 
Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation (1999)
18 See eg Art 8 of the Namibian Constitution (1990), Arts 2 and 4 of Israel’s Basic Law: Human Dignity and 
Liberty (1992), Art 21 of the Russian Constitution (1993), Art 24 of the Constitution of Ethiopia (1994), 
s 10 of the South African Constitution, Art 7 of the Swiss Constitution (1999), Art 21 of the Constitution 
of Colombia (1991), and Art 30 of the Polish Constitution (1997)  
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German Basic Law has proved to be particularly influential, and many of these 
provisions entrench dignity as inviolable,19 and/or impose an obligation on the 
state to respect and protect the dignity of the person.20 Dignity also features 
frequently as a founding value.21 Sometimes, dignity is invoked as the basis 
of other human rights22 or as a guide to their interpretation.23 In particular, 
it is often referred to in conjunction with the values of freedom (or the free 
development of the person),24 equality25 and solidarity.26 Sometimes, it is also 
related to the concept of the social state,27 or used to ground the right to social 
assistance and security.28
However, it would be a mistake to restrict the significance of the ideal 
of human dignity to those constitutional provisions which expressly refer 
to it. The idea of the inherent worth and dignity of the person and of indi-
vidual autonomy is so basic to current understandings of human rights, 
that it is almost inevitable that they will inform rights discourse – whether 
in the course of pronouncements on the meaning of the rights to life and 
liberty, or in the context of procedural guarantees or the right not to be 
subjected to cruel or unusual punishment. Even in the absence of any ref-
erence in the Constitution to human dignity, the United States Supreme 
Court has, on occasion, invoked the language of dignity. The late Justice 
Brennan, in particular, sought to establish a dignity-based jurisprudence 
and insisted, in the face of opposition by the majority of the Court, that the 
death penalty constituted a brutal assault on the dignity of the individual, 
19 See Art 8(1) of the Namibian Constitution (1990) and Art 30 of the Polish Constitution (1997)
20 See Art 2 of the Greek Constitution (1975), Art 10 of the South African Constitution, Art 30 of the Polish 
Constitution (1997) and Art 10 of the Swiss Constitution (1999)  
21 See eg Art 1(2) of the German Basic Law (1949); Art 1 of the Constitution of Portugal (1976); Art 
10 of the Constitution of Spain (1978) (“[t]he dignity of the person, the inviolable rights which 
are inherent, the free development of the personality, respect for the law and the rights of others, 
are the foundation of political order and social peace”); the preface to the Namibian Constitution 
(1990) (“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members 
of the human family is indispensable for freedom, justice and peace”); Art 10(1) of the Colombian 
Constitution (1991); the preface to the Polish Constitution (1997) (“[w]e call upon all those who will 
apply this Constitution for the good of the Third Republic to do so paying respect to the inherent 
dignity of the person …”)
22 See eg Art 1(1) of the German Basic Law (1949); Art 30 of the Polish Constitution (1997) (“[t]he inher-
ent and inalienable dignity of the person shall constitute a source of freedoms and rights of persons 
and citizens”); s 1 of Israel’s Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992) (“[b]asic human rights in 
Israel are based on the recognition of the value of the human being, and the sanctity of his life and his 
freedom”)
23 See eg s 39(1) of the South African Constitution and the preface to the Polish Constitution (1997)
24 See Art 1 of the Portuguese Constitution (1976), Art 10(1) of the Spanish Constitution (1978), Art 24 of 
the Ethiopian Constitution (1994), and the preface to the Polish Constitution (1997)
25 See Art 13(1) of the Portuguese Constitution (1996) (“[a]ll citizens have the same social dignity and are 
equal before the law”) and Art 3 of the Italian Constitution (“[a]ll citizens have equal social dignity and 
are equal before the law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, personal 
and social conditions”)
26 See Art 1 of the Portuguese Constitution (1976) and the preface to the Polish Constitution (1997)
27 See Art 7 of the Russian Constitution (1993)
28 Art 12 of the Swiss Constitution (1999) (“[w]hoever is in distress without the ability to take care of 
him- or herself has the right to help and assistance and to the means indispensable for a life led in human 
dignity”); s 19(1) of the Constitution of Finland (2000) (“[t]hose who cannot obtain the means necessary 
for a life of dignity have the right to receive indispensable subsistence and care”)  Cf also Art 151(1) of the 
Weimar Constitution of 1919 (referred to under 3 1 below)
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and thus violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unu-
sual punishment.29
2 3  Concluding remarks
Far from being simply a preoccupation of South African constitutional 
drafters and judges, human dignity is part and parcel of a shared constitutional 
vocabulary which cuts across national boundaries. Moreover, it is closely 
bound up with other rights and values (freedom, equality and the like) that are 
just as integral to current constitutional understandings.
Reliance on human dignity serves a number of functions. In the first 
place, it often signals a break with a history of oppression, totalitarianism, 
colonialism and discrimination, and the wish to establish a new national or 
supranational order based on respect for human rights. Secondly, by invok-
ing the inherent dignity and worth of the human person, the architects of a 
constitutional order or supranational human rights regime appeal to a higher 
law or transnational legal consensus, and thus seek to ground the protection 
of human rights in something more enduring than public opinion, which is 
seen as constantly shifting and sometimes fickle. Thirdly, in addition to the 
symbolic and foundational functions referred to above, constitutional appeals 
to human dignity have a legal significance which extends beyond the merely 
aspirational. Dignity is often entrenched as an individual right. It also has the 
status of an objective legal norm which serves as a guideline to the interpreta-
tion of ordinary law. Finally, to the extent that dignity is perceived to be at the 
centre of the constitutional value order and because dignity is closely related 
to other rights and values, such as freedom, equality and social solidarity, it 
is seen as a mechanism for the resolution of or mediation between conflicting 
constitutional values. Accordingly, dignity sometimes plays an important role 
in determining the proper boundaries of constitutionally protected rights and 
interests and in the balancing of conflicting interests.
And yet, we should not jump to conclusions too hastily. It is one thing to 
note the pervasiveness of dignity in human rights discourse, and another to 
conclude that dignity is the central constitutional norm of our time which 
should guide the interpretation of all human rights and which is capable of 
mediating constitutional value conflicts in a principled manner. The growing 
transnational consensus on the importance of human dignity, as it finds 
expression in the constitutional and treaty provisions referred to above, has 
been formulated at such a high level of generality that these conclusions 
29 As Brennan J remarked in a concurring judgment in Furman v Georgia 408 US 238 (1972):
   “The State, even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human 
beings  A punishment is ‘cruel and unusual,’ therefore, if it does not comport with human dignity ” 
(270)
 See also the remark of Warren CJ in Trop v Dulles 356 US 86 (1958): “[t]he basic concept underlying 
the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man” (100)  It must, however, be pointed out 
that there is considerable resistance among judges in the United States to a dignity-based jurisprudence, 
and that the dignity-based jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court is often contrasted in the 
academic literature with the liberty-based jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court  See generally Meyer 
& Parent The Constitution of Rights: Human Dignity and American Values (1992); Eberle Dignity and 
Liberty: Constitutional Visions in Germany and the United States (2002)
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simply do not follow.30 To be able to evaluate such claims, we need a better 
understanding of the ways in which dignity is concretized in particular 
constitutional systems. We also need to move beyond platitudes about the 
“interrelatedness” of dignity and other values and rights, and study the ways 
in which the overlaps, intersections and conflicts between dignity and other 
constitutional values are conceptualized in foreign jurisprudence. Hence the 
attempt in the next section to come to terms with the German literature on 
human dignity.
3  Dignity in German constitutional law
3 1  Textual and historical setting
Article 1 of the Basic Law provides:
“(1)  Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state 
authority.
(2)  The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis 
of every community, of peace and of justice in the world.
(3)  The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as directly 
applicable law.”
That human dignity is a fundamental constitutional value is evident not 
only from its entrenchment in the very first provision of the Basic Law, 
but also from the way in which “inviolable and inalienable human rights” 
are made to flow from the inviolability of human dignity. Also noticeable 
are the absolute terms in which dignity is asserted. Dignity is said to be 
“inviolable”, and no provision is made for its limitation by, or in terms 
of, legislation.31 But dignity is not only shielded from ordinary legislative 
incursions. The principles laid down in Article 1 are also shielded from 
constitutional amendment by Article 79(3). Dignity thus belongs, alongside 
democracy, federalism and the social state, to an unalterable core of consti-
tutional values and principles.
The prominence accorded to human dignity was a direct response to the 
terrors of National Socialism. The drafters of the Basic Law wished to stress 
that the dignity of the human person and not the “dignity of the state” – a notion 
which was central to National-Socialist attacks on the Weimar Constitution of 
30 A single example should suffice  Even though a link between gender equality and human dignity is – quite 
rightly – established in international human rights conventions and some national constitutions, it does 
not follow from this that gender equality can be equated with the restoration of women’s dignity at either 
the conceptual or remedial level  Whether or not diverse social aims such as the advancement of women 
in political and public life (Art 7 of CEDAW), the elimination of discrimination against women in the 
fields of employment (Art 11) and health care (Art 12), and the advancement of women in rural areas (Art 
14) can all be achieved through a dignity-centred approach, are vexed questions which cannot simply 
be answered on the basis of a superficial textual analysis of the relevant human rights documents  For a 
political-theoretical debate on the question whether gender discrimination can be adequately redressed 
through a politics of recognition or whether, in addition, redistributive strategies are needed which are 
not reducible to a recognition-based politics, see Fraser & Honneth Redistribution or Recognition? A 
Political-Philosophical Exchange (2003)
31 See 3 5 below  Because dignity may be balanced neither with other fundamental rights nor with the public 
interest, it is often given a restrictive interpretation  See 3 3 1 below
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1919 – was the foundation of the new constitutional order.32 Although the 
members of the Parliamentary Council, the body responsible for the adoption 
and ratification of the Basic Law, were agreed on the importance of human 
dignity as cornerstone for the protection of fundamental rights, they found it 
far more difficult to reach consensus on the formulation of Article 1. This was 
mainly due to ideological and philosophical differences relating to the sources 
of human dignity. The idea of human dignity has a rich and varied history, 
and has roots in ancient philosophy (Stoicism), religions such as Judaism 
and Christianity (man as imago dei), humanism, Kantianism and the like.33 
Whether dignity should be understood in say, a Christian or Kantian sense, 
and whether Article 1 should include a reference to God – or natural law – 
as the source of human rights, gave rise to much controversy.34 Ultimately, 
a formulation was chosen which seemed compatible with a wide range of 
philosophical perspectives.
The idea of dignity as a constitutional precept was not an invention of the 
Basic Law. The drafters of the Basic Law of 1949 had some historical prec-
edents which they could draw on. The Weimar Constitution of 1919 already 
linked human dignity to the idea of the social state by providing in Article 
151(1) that the ordering of economic life must be in accordance with the prin-
ciples of justice, with the purpose of ensuring a dignified existence for all. 
The constitutions of three Bundesländer (Bavaria (1946), Hessen (1946) and 
Bremen (1947)) also preceded the Basic Law in their demand that the state 
respect human dignity.35
3 2  Dignity as a right, a norm, and a value
Article 1(1) imposes a duty on all state authority to respect and protect 
human dignity.36 The duty to respect is a negative one: the state must refrain 
from performing any action that infringes human dignity. For example, the 
32 Art 1 of the draft constitutional text produced by the Herrenchiemsee Convention, which was influential 
in the framing of Art 1 of the Basic Law, proclaimed inter alia that the state exists for the sake of the 
individual, and that the individual does not exist for the sake of the state  The Herrenchiemsee Convention 
was a meeting of experts on constitutional law which produced a draft constitution in August 1948  It 
preceded the meeting of the Parliamentary Council, which was entrusted with the drafting of the Basic 
Law
33 See Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 2 ed (2004) 143-151  Dreier is justifiably critical of a tendency 
in the academic literature to overlook the vast differences and discontinuities among ancient, medieval 
and modern conceptions of dignity  He points out that for stoic thinkers such as Cicero, human dignity 
was more of a duty than a right  He further argues that the Christian notion of man as imago dei is closely 
bound up with the doctrine of original sin  For centuries, it was not viewed as an impediment to the 
institutionalization of grossly unequal social relations such as that between master and slave  Similarly, 
for a long time the commonality of the human species had to play second fiddle to the distinction between 
Christians, non-Christians and heretics  While Dreier does not deny the role of Christianity in the evo-
lution of the idea of human dignity, he points out that Christian doctrine has by no means played an 
exclusive role in the institutionalization of dignity within the legal-political sphere, and that it has often 
impeded its realization
34 See Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 153-155; Stern Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
Bd IV/1 (2006) 13-14
35 See Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 151-153 for a discussion of some other historical precedents
36 See Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 213-225; Häberle “Menschenwürde als Grundlage” in Handbuch 
des Staatsrechts 354-355; Herdegen “Art  1 Abs  1” in Maunz & Dürig Grundgesetz Kommentar 
(2003/2005) 1 46-48
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state may not engage in torture, impose cruel or inhuman punishment, or 
perform any action which reduces the individual to a mere object. By con-
trast, the injunction to protect imposes a positive duty on the state to create a 
legal order which protects the individual from infringements by third parties. 
Here, the legislature is given a wide discretion in its choice of means. For 
instance, the legislature usually has a choice whether or not to criminalise a 
particular infringement of dignity.37 However, this discretion is limited by the 
principle of proportionality. The legislature would, for example, neglect its 
duty to protect if it failed to criminalise rape or sexual assault.38 In addition, 
the state’s obligation to ensure the conditions of a dignified existence is based 
upon the duty to respect dignity, read together with the principle of the social 
state. Finally, the indirect horizontal application (mittelbare Drittwirkung) of 
Article 1(1) and its radiating effect on private-law relations are also grounded 
in the state’s duty to protect.39
A second distinction, which is closely related – though not identical – to the 
distinction between the duty to respect and protect, is that between dignity 
as a subjective right and dignity as an objective norm. Whether dignity con-
stitutes a subjective individual right, in addition to being an objective norm 
of constitutional law, remains the subject of contention. The text of the Basic 
Law is ambiguous. On the one hand, the dignity guarantee features as the first 
provision under the chapter on fundamental rights. On the other hand, Article 
1(3) refers to “the following basic rights” which “bind the legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary”, thus creating the impression that dignity itself is 
not a fundamental right. Today, the majority opinion seems to be that dignity 
constitutes a subjective right. Proponents of this view argue, inter alia, that 
Article 1(1) seeks to protect the dignity and worth of the individual in her 
concrete circumstances, and that it is not simply concerned with the dignity of 
“humanity” in the abstract.40 However, other commentators argue that Article 
1(1) is fundamentally different from any of the rights enshrined in the Basic 
Law: not only does it extend to all spheres of life (other than, say, the freedom 
rights, which each cover a particular area of human activity), but it is absolute 
in nature and not subject to limitation or to balancing with countervailing 
rights. Treating dignity as a right could easily lead to its relativization. In this 
view, little is lost by denying dignity the status of a right, as dignity informs 
the interpretation of all rights, and as it is almost always used in conjunction 
with other rights, such as freedom or equality.41
Whether or not dignity is regarded as a fundamental right, it is generally 
accepted that it is a fundamental principle of constitutional law. Far from 
37 Cf the Constitutional Court’s finding in BVerfGE 39, 1 45-51 (1975) (the First Abortion case) that the 
state’s duty to protect unborn life against abortion, as derived from Arts 1(1) and 2(2), may include the use 
of criminal law
38 Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 218
39 Häberle “Menschenwürde als Grundlage” in Handbuch des Staatsrechts 349; Stern Staatsrecht 
Deutschlands Bd IV/1 66
40 Herdegen “Art  1 Abs  1” in Grundgesetz Kommentar 18-20  See also Stern Staatsrecht Deutschlands Bd 
IV/1 61-64
41 Dürig “Der Grundrechtssatz von der Menschenwürde” 1956 AöR 117 118-120; Dreier Grundgesetz 
Kommentar Bd I 207-209; Isensee 2006 AöR 209-210
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representing simply a moral value or programmatic statement, dignity is an 
objective legal norm which directly binds all state authority. A number of 
metaphors have been used to highlight the special place of dignity in the con-
stitutional scheme. Dignity has been described as the highest constitutional 
value,42 as being at the very top of the value order established by the Basic 
Law,43 and as the focal point of such value order.44 Or, as the Constitutional 
Court famously pronounced in its Lüth judgment,45 the Basic Law has erected 
an objective value order which revolves around the free development of the 
personality and human dignity. All spheres of law (legislation, the admin-
istration and the judiciary) must be guided by this value order. It thus also 
influences private law: no private law norm may be inconsistent with it, and 
all norms must be interpreted in line with its spirit.
The idea of dignity as an objective legal norm manifests itself in a variety 
of ways. In the first place, dignity is viewed as the highest constitutional value 
and one of the leading constitutional principles, which guides the interpreta-
tion of the Constitution in general and of the fundamental rights enshrined 
in the Constitution, in particular.46 Secondly, the state’s duty to protect rights 
closely associated with dignity arises from dignity’s centrality to the objective 
constitutional value order. For instance, the state’s obligation to protect the life 
of the unborn is derived from the objective dimension of the constitutional 
guarantees of life and dignity.47 Thirdly, the horizontal application of funda-
mental rights and their radiating effect on private law relations likewise flow 
from the idea of an objective value order which influences all spheres of law, 
including private law.
As noted above, dignity stands in a close relationship to other provisions in 
the chapter on fundamental rights. This is clear from Article 1(2) of the Basic 
Law which, immediately following the dignity guarantee, proclaims:
“The German people therefore uphold human rights as inviolable and inalienable and as the basis of 
every community, of peace and justice in the world.”48
Dignity is thus seen as foundational to human rights. This does not mean that 
the whole catalogue of fundamental rights arises from the dignity guarantee 
and is therefore shielded from constitutional amendment.49 Moreover, in 
contradistinction to the right of every person to the free development of her 
personality (Article 2(1)) which is taken to guarantee freedoms not expressly 
mentioned in the specific freedom guarantees, dignity is not a catch-all right, 
as it is feared that such a role would lead to its trivialisation.50 However, 
dignity is seen as a guide to the interpretation of fundamental rights and is 
often used in conjunction with specific rights guarantees. It is said to stand 
42 BVerfGE 45, 187 227 (1977); BVerfGE 6, 32 41 (1957)
43 BVerfGE 27, 1 6 (1969)
44 BVerfGE 65, 1 41 (1983)
45 BVerfGE 7, 198 205 (1958)
46 BVerfGE 27, 1 6 (1969)
47 Cf BVerfGE 39, 1 41-42 (1975) (First Abortion case)
48 Emphasis added
49 Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 226
50 Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 226; Stern Staatsrecht Deutschlands Bd IV/1 74
HUMAN DIGNITY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 181
       
in a particularly close relationship with the rights to life, bodily integrity 
and personal freedom. Other rights, such as freedom of religion, equality, 
procedural rights (eg the right to participate in one’s own trial) and the right 
to vote are also believed to contain a significant core of human dignity.51 The 
interpretation of these and other rights is informed by the dignity guarantee.52 
Dignity is sometimes also used in conjunction with other constitutional 
principles, such as those of the social state and democracy.
The recognition of the duties to respect and protect, and of the subjective 
and objective dimensions of human dignity, has yielded a rich constitutional 
jurisprudence, which guards against public and private violations of dignity 
and which is attentive to the intersections, overlaps and tensions between dig-
nity and other rights and values. However, this jurisprudence is not without 
problems. Sometimes, the duty to protect is used to restrict personal autonomy 
and individual choice, thus raising questions about the relationship between 
the subjective and objective dimensions of dignity. For instance, the Federal 
Administrative Court relied on the objective dimension of dignity in finding 
that a peep show violated Article 1(1), even though the women who partici-
pated acted voluntarily.53 The way in which this judgment invoked dignity to 
curtail the freedom of participants and thus to deny their autonomy – a key 
ingredient of dignity – has been vehemently criticised.54 Moreover, the inter-
relatedness of dignity and other rights and values raises difficult questions 
about the capacity of the legislature to limit rights which are closely related 
to human dignity, or to amend constitutional provisions which stand in close 
proximity to it.55
3 3  The scope and meaning of dignity
3 3 1  Interpretive difficulties
Dignity is notoriously difficult to define. Some constitutional lawyers have 
given up on this quest, declaring that the meaning of dignity can only be 
determined on a case-by-case basis, or that dignity can only be defined nega-
tively, with reference to past instances of its violation.56 The trouble with this 
strategy, as Dreier rightly points out, is that it relies on a consensus about what 
constitutes an impairment of human dignity, and that this consensus runs out 
as soon as we leave behind obvious incursions of dignity, such as torture and 
humiliation, and concern ourselves with new, often more subtle threats or 
potential threats.57
51 See Herdegen “Art  1 Abs  1” in Grundgesetz Kommentar 14-17; Stern Staatsrecht Deutschlands Bd IV/1 
74-85
52 It is perhaps more accurate to describe the relationship between dignity and specific rights provisions 
as one of mutual influence  Not only does the dignity guarantee inform the interpretation of specific 
rights, but such rights also help to shape understandings of dignity  See Häberle “Menschenwürde als 
Grundlage” in Handbuch des Staatsrechts 349; Herdegen “Art  1 Abs  1” in Grundgesetz Kommentar 
15
53 BVerwGE 64, 274 279-280  See also 3 3 2 below
54 See Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 218-220
55 See 3 5 below
56 For references to the relevant literature, see Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 166-167  
57 167
182 STELL LR 2009 2
       
Attempts to determine the scope and meaning of dignity are further compli-
cated by the special place of Article 1(1) within the Basic Law. As noted above, 
dignity is viewed as the highest constitutional value and one of the leading con-
stitutional principles. Moreover, the dignity guarantee is absolute – it is insulated 
both from limitation by, or in terms of, legislation and from constitutional amend-
ment. For these reasons, it is often stated that the meaning of dignity should not 
be trivialised or inflated.58 According dignity a too extensive meaning would 
either paralyse government or detract from the absolute nature of Article 1(1).59
Some authors also warn against the use of dignity as a “magic wand” which 
is supposed to solve highly complex ethical questions such as those raised 
by new advances within the fields of biotechnology and human genetics.60 
Concerns about the instrumentalisation and objectification of human embryos 
or persons in the areas of assisted reproduction, pre-implantation diagnostics, 
research on superfluous embryos, stem cell research, genetic therapy and 
cloning are, admittedly, often real, and it is understandable that dignity is 
invoked in these contexts. There is nevertheless a danger that the – absolute 
and eternal – guarantee of human dignity could be used to forestall democratic 
debate on issues that are the subject of widespread and reasonable disagree-
ment. The same goes for abortion, an area in which the Federal Constitutional 
Court on two occasions found that existing legislation did not go far enough 
in protecting the life and dignity of the unborn.61
3 3 2  The object formulation
By far the most influential definition of dignity has been the so-called 
“object formula”. This definition, which found its first systematic elaboration 
in the work of Günter Dürig, rests on Kant’s categorical imperative in terms 
of which a human being is an end in itself and not simply a means to an end. 
According to Dürig, the dignity guarantee is rooted in the idea that man is 
distinct from impersonal nature by virtue of his mind, which enables him 
to become conscious of himself, to determine himself and to shape his own 
environment.62 To treat human beings as objects is to deny their capacity to 
shape themselves and their environment. In Dürig’s formulation:
“Human dignity as such is affected when a concrete human being is reduced to an object, to a mere 
means, to a dispensable quantity. [Violations of dignity involve] the degradation of the person to a 
thing, which can, in its entirety, be grasped, disposed of, registered, brainwashed, replaced, used and 
expelled”.63
58 In the words of Dürig 1956 AöR 124: “Art  1 I ist keine ‘kleine Münze’”  In his view, dignity is trivialised 
by attempts to use it to expand the protection of personal honour or to preserve common decency (127)  
See also Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 164-165
59 An example of an alleged incursion which was found to be too trivial was the spelling of a name in a tele-
phone invoice, which was processed electronically, by “oe” instead of “ö” (BVerwGE 31, 236 (1969))
60 See Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 165-166
61 BVerfGE 39, 1 (1975); BVerfGE 88, 203 (1993)  On the question whether these medical and research 
procedures impair human dignity, see Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 173-176, 179-202; Häberle 
“Menschenwürde als Grundlage” in Handbuch des Staatsrechts 359-362; Herdegen “Art  1 Abs  1” in 
Grundgesetz Kommentar 57-65; Stern Staatsrecht Deutschlands Bd IV/1 27-47
62 Dürig 1956 AöR 125
63 127 (my translation)
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This formulation has found favour with the courts. For instance, the Federal 
Constitutional Court stated in the Microcensus case64 that a requirement that a 
person must record and register all aspects of his personality would amount to 
treating him as a mere object. The dignity guarantee, in the view of the Court, 
requires the state to treat the individual as a subject capable of self-determina-
tion – the state “must leave the individual with an inner space for the purpose 
of the free and responsible development of his personality”.65 However, since 
the information required in the Microcensus case did not concern intimate 
details which are usually withheld from the outside world, it was held that 
the legislation in question violated neither human dignity nor the right of the 
person to the free development of his personality. In the Life Imprisonment 
case,66 the Court similarly held that the state may not “turn the offender into 
an object of crime prevention to the detriment of his constitutionally protected 
right to social worth and respect”.67 The Federal Administrative Court also 
found that “peep shows” resulted in the objectification of the women con-
cerned, thereby violating their dignity, and that the prohibition of such shows 
was, accordingly, constitutional.68 However, in the Second Abortion case69 
the Constitutional Court found that a pregnant woman who is required to par-
ticipate in a counselling procedure is not treated as a mere object, as the law 
recognises her autonomy and responsibility, and views her as a partner.70
The object formulation has much intuitive appeal. It corresponds to some of 
our most basic intuitions about injustice and is rooted in notions of individual 
autonomy and self-determination, yet accords dignity to all human beings 
including those who lack the capacity for self-determination due to mental 
instability or illness.71 However, doubts exist over the capacity of the object 
formula to constrain judicial decision-making. Critics aver that the object for-
mula is hopelessly vague and indeterminate and fails to provide a principled 
basis for the adjudication of concrete cases. Put differently, the object formula 
is over-inclusive, as there are many instances of objectifying treatment which 
do not and cannot constitute a violation of the constitutional guarantee of 
dignity. After all, we have countless dealings (eg commercial dealings) with 
other persons whom we view as mere means to an end and whose personhood 
is of little or no interest to us.72
Two examples should suffice to illustrate the problems with the object for-
mula. The first is the death penalty. According to a number of authors, the 
death penalty, which is prohibited by Article 102 of the Basic Law, would not 
64 BVerfGE 27, 1 (1969)
65 6  The translation is that of Kommers The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany 2 ed (1997) 299  See also BVerfGE 65, 1 (1983)
66 BVerfGE 45, 187 (1977)
67 228 (translation by Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany 308)
68 BVerwGE 64, 274 277-280 (1981)  See also BVerwGE 84, 314 317ff (1990)
69 BVerfGE 88, 203 (1993)
70 281
71 See Dürig 1956 AöR 125
72 See for criticisms of the object formula, Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 167-168; Herdegen “Art  
1 Abs  1” in Grundgesetz Kommentar 23; Hofmann “Die versprochene Menschenwürde” 1993 AöR 353 
360; Stern Staatsrecht Deutschlands Bd IV/1 18-19
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per se constitute an impairment of dignity.73 Indeed, it could be argued that 
rather than reducing the convicted person to a mere object of the criminal 
process, the death penalty treats her as an autonomous person who must take 
responsibility for her deeds. On the other hand, it could be argued that the 
death penalty is the ultimate form of objectification which treats the person as 
a disposable quantity, reduces her to the object of a cold-blooded and deeply 
dehumanising process and negates her capacity for self-renewal.74 The peep 
show judgement similarly reveals the difficulties associated with the object 
formulation. The finding that the naked woman who is being watched by men 
in private cabins is made the object of their commercially exploited lust makes 
eminent sense, particularly in view of the fact that she cannot see them but 
that they are able, once they have inserted a coin into a machine, to watch 
her through a window and, while doing so, masturbate in the isolation of 
their cabins. And yet, despite the voyeurism, the commercial exploitation and 
the mechanised, automated quality of the transaction, the question remains 
whether respect for the woman as an autonomous subject does not preclude 
attempts to protect her dignity in the name of a morality she may not share. In 
this case, as in the case of the death penalty, the object formula is inconclusive 
and can be used either to protect a sphere of personal autonomy or to justify 
restrictions on the life and liberty of the individual in the name of a more 
communitarian conception of duty and personhood.
Despite these difficulties, there is a sense among scholars that the dilution 
of the object formula carries some very real risks. This is nowhere more evi-
dent than in the Constitutional Court’s judgment dealing with the interception 
of private communications and the tapping of telephones, and the almost uni-
versal scholarly condemnation thereof.75 The case involved a constitutional 
amendment dealing with restrictions on the privacy of correspondence, posts 
and telecommunications. It provided that the law authorising such restrictions 
may, in the interest of the protection of the free democratic order or the exist-
ence or security of the federation or of a Land, provide that the person affected 
shall not be informed of the restriction and that recourse to the courts shall be 
replaced by a review of the case by agencies appointed by the legislature. It 
was argued that the constitutional amendment reduced citizens to mere objects 
of state conduct to the extent that it authorised serious incursions into their 
73 Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 215-216; Herdegen “Art  1 Abs  1” in Grundgesetz Kommentar 57  
But see also Podlech “Art  1 Abs  1” in Denninger, Hofmann-Riem, Schneider & Stein (eds) Kommentar 
zum Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland Bd 1 3 ed (2001) 17
74 Consider also the Life Imprisonment case (BVerfGE 45, 187 (1977)) referred to above  In that case, the 
Court found that lifelong imprisonment, as practised in the Federal Republic of Germany, does not violate 
human dignity, as prisoners have the chance to be reintegrated into society and as they are in most cases 
released after having served fifteen to 25 years of their sentence  The Court held that, even in those 
cases where a person continues to be dangerous and is not released, that does not constitute a violation of 
dignity as long as there is compliance with the principle of proportionality  Again, one could argue in sup-
port of the Court’s finding, that there is no impairment of the autonomy and worth of the person as long 
as the door is not closed altogether on the possibility of her rehabilitation and reintegration into society  
However, it is hard not to be cynical about the conclusion that such a person is not reduced to a mere object 
of crime prevention  It would perhaps be more honest to concede that such a person’s dignity is infringed, 
but to hold that such infringement is necessitated by the need to protect the life and safety of others  Of 
course, this line of reasoning would fly in the face of the idea that dignity is protected absolutely
75 BVerfGE 30, 1 (1970)
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private sphere under conditions of absolute secrecy, that it violated Article 1(1) 
of the Basic Law, and that the amendment was thus not permitted in terms of 
Article 79(3). The Court rejected this argument. It questioned the capacity of 
general formulas, such as the object formula, to determine whether a violation 
of dignity has occurred in a concrete case. It then continued:
“The human person is often the mere object of relationships and of societal development, as well as 
of the law… That on its own does not constitute a violation of human dignity. In addition, the person 
must be subjected to treatment which, in principle, casts doubt on his quality as a subject or which, in 
the concrete case, shows arbitrary disregard for his dignity. To violate human dignity, the treatment of 
a person at the hand of a public authority must thus be an expression of contempt for the value which 
accrues to every human being by virtue of the fact that he is a person.”76
In the Court’s view, non-notification is not an expression of contempt for 
the human person whose privacy is infringed, but a burden imposed on the 
citizen by virtue of the need to protect the existence of the state and the free 
democratic order. Moreover it found that, even though respect for the quality 
of the person as a subject normally presupposes the right to enforce one’s 
rights in a court of law, the exclusion of judicial avenues is not in this case 
motivated by contempt for the human person, nor is the individual exposed to 
arbitrary treatment, as other (non-judicial) forms of control are provided.77
The judgment has been criticised for its dilution of the dignity guarantee 
and its willingness to sacrifice dignity in the name of state security.78 The 
criteria employed by the Court ultimately render individuals – including indi-
viduals who are not themselves suspected of activities which may endanger 
state security or the free democratic order, but who have contact with such 
persons – powerless objects of state surveillance who are oblivious of the true 
state of affairs and who are precluded from challenging the state’s actions. 
While the Court is correct that the object formula is often inconclusive, the 
attempt to supplement it with reference to the notion of “contemptuous treat-
ment” is problematic. In the first place, “contemptuous treatment” places the 
threshold too high and reduces Article 1(1) to the prohibition of a narrow 
category of utterly humiliating treatment.79 Secondly, it seems arbitrary to 
require a subjective intention to devalue a person, as violations of dignity can 
also result from measures taken in good faith and which are aimed at achiev-
ing legitimate objectives.
3 3 3  Individual and community
The Federal Constitutional Court has stressed that the Basic Law does not 
entrench the image of an atomistic individual, but recognises that citizens 
76 25-26 (my translation)
77 26-27
78 See the dissenting judgment at 39-43, as well as Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 168; Häberle 
Kommentierte Verfassungsrechtsprechung (1979) 107-109; Hofmann 1993 AöR 360; and Stern Staatsrecht 
Deutschlands Bd IV/1 20 for criticisms of the majority judgment
79 The dissenting judgment points out that it tends to reduce Art 1(1) to the prohibition of the reintroduction 
of torture, pillory and the methods of the Third Reich (39)
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are members of and bound to the community.80 As the Court held in an early 
judgment:81
“The image of man in the Basic Law is not that of an isolated, sovereign individual; rather, the 
Basic Law has decided in favor of a relationship between individual and community in the sense of 
a person’s dependence on and commitment to the community, without infringing upon a person’s 
individual value.”82
Human dignity, too, is taken to vest not in individuals who exist prior to 
and in abstraction of the society in which they live, but in persons who are 
constituted through intimate and familial relationships, communication and 
participation in the life of the community.
Sometimes, the idea that the individual is bound to the community is used 
to justify the limitation of individual rights and freedoms. Individuals have 
a duty to respect the dignity of others, and this duty sets limits to their own 
freedom. It has also been suggested that individual rights are limited by the 
obligation to respect the right of future generations to a dignified existence.83
The idea that the Basic Law is informed by a particular image of the human 
person is controversial. It has been pointed out that there is scant textual sup-
port for this contention. More fundamentally, it is sometimes objected that 
the idea of a unitary “image of man” which is taken to be constitutionally 
entrenched, is highly problematic in a modern, pluralistic society which 
is characterised by a plurality of self-understandings and ways of being in 
the world. What makes this notion even more dangerous is the fact that it is 
frequently invoked as the basis of individual duties and fundamental-rights 
limitations.84
On the other hand, Häberle points out that the image of man which is said 
to inform the Basic Law is flexible – and contradictory – enough to accommo-
date a plurality of vastly different self-understandings.85 It encompasses both 
the autonomy of the individual and her membership of and boundedness to the 
community. It serves not only to ground individual duties, which may result 
in restrictions to individual freedoms, but also to strengthen and to expand 
the sphere of personal freedom.86 It encompasses both the ideal of the active 
citizen who participates in the political life of the community, and the right 
to withdraw into the private sphere or a life of contemplation.87 In his view, 
the so-called constitutional image of man does not carry in itself the seeds of 
totalitarianism. On the contrary, it is fragmentary and open to a plurality of 
worldviews. What it does, is to provide the constitutional interpreter with a 
framework of possibilities. Excluded from this framework are the extremes: 
an image of the self that is unencumbered by social relationships and com-
munal ties, and a constitutional understanding which subordinates individual 
80 See BVerfGE 27, 344 351 (1970)
81 BVerfGE 4, 7 (1954)
82 15-16 (translation by Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany 305)
83 Häberle “Menschenwürde als Grundlage” in Handbuch des Staatsrechts 347-348
84 Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 229-230
85 Häberle Das Menschenbild im Verfassungsstaat 3 ed (2005) 37, 60-63
86 47-50
87 50-52
HUMAN DIGNITY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 187
       
autonomy to the common good, or views the individual as a mere means to 
its achievement. Between these two extremes, however, lie a wide range of 
possibilities, leaving the legislature a margin of discretion as to how best to 
harmonise or articulate freedom with solidarity, and individual autonomy 
with the public interest.
The idea of the constitutional “image of man” has thus helped the Federal 
Constitutional Court to avoid a strict dichotomy between individual autonomy 
and the public interest.88 It also constrains constitutional decision-making to 
the extent that it rules out certain interpretive options. However, it neither 
provides us with an account of the various ways in which human dignity and 
the public interest intersect, overlap and clash, nor tells us where to draw 
the boundary, in concrete cases, between individual autonomy and the public 
interest.89 What is needed is a better theoretical understanding of the concept 
of human dignity, its various meanings and manifestations, and its relation-
ship to other constitutional values.
3 3 4  Manifestations and theoretical orientations
The constitutional commitment to human dignity is manifested in seven 
broad principles.90 First, dignity implies the equality of all persons. Any form 
of systematic discrimination or humiliation violates the dignity of the person, 
as does the treatment of a particular group as “second-class”. Secondly, dig-
nity demands respect for the individuality, identity, moral integrity and free 
self-determination of every person. This entails, inter alia, the prohibition of 
attempts to defeat a person’s will or conquer her identity (for example, through 
the use of truth serum or lie detectors), respect for the individual’s sexual self-
determination, and protection of the intimate sphere. Thirdly, dignity requires 
the protection of the bodily and psychological integrity of the person. The 
prohibition of torture and other degrading treatment and punishment flows 
directly from this commitment. Fourthly, the decision to have children is seen 
as an aspect of human dignity and personal self-determination. At the same 
time, however, dignity sets limits to the use of reproductive technology which 
is seen as objectifying and degrading. Fifthly, the prohibition of the use of 
88 This is probably what the Federal Constitutional Court had in mind when it stated in BVerfGE 65, 1 (1983) 
(the Census Act case) that “[t]he Basic Law has resolved the tension between the individual and society 
by postulating a community-related and community-bound individual” (44; translation by Kommers 
Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany 325)  The Court does not view the relationship between the 
individual and community in terms of a stark opposition, but is able to appreciate the affinity, in a consti-
tutional democracy, between the common good and the equal recognition of all individuals  Nevertheless, 
its choice of words is unfortunate  While the common good often intersects and overlaps with individual 
rights, this does not alter the basic fact that individual claims to autonomy and equal recognition often 
clash with the perceived common good  No constitutional conception of personhood or image of man can 
resolve this tension – unless it appeals, in Rousseauan fashion, to an understanding of the general will 
which labels all social dissent as misconceived and illegitimate
89 Cf the criticism of Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 230 that the Federal Administrative Court has 
used the idea of the constitutional image of man in an arbitrary fashion  Sometimes it is used to limit fun-
damental rights, while at other times it serves to strengthen them  According to Dreier, the constitutional 
image of man provides no principled orientation for the decision of cases
90 See Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 170-171; Häberle “Menschenwürde als Grundlage” in Handbuch 
des Staatsrechts 343; Herdegen “Art  1 Abs  1” in Grundgesetz Kommentar 49-68; Stern Staatsrecht 
Deutschlands Bd IV/1 17-60
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excessive force by the state is related to the dignity guarantee, at least to the 
extent that the use of such force denies the equal worth and autonomy of the 
individual. Examples include the principles of proportionality and nulla poena 
sine lege. In the sixth place, every person has the right to social recognition. 
The right to the protection of one’s honour is believed to have some basis in 
the dignity guarantee. Similarly, a condemned criminal must be given at least 
some chance of reintegration into society. Finally, the constitutional norm of 
human dignity requires the state to provide certain minimum material guar-
antees, which must ensure a dignified existence for all.
Despite the existence of a broad consensus on the various dimensions of 
dignity, disagreement is rife in cases of potential infringements of, or threats 
to, dignity which are more subtle, and in areas marked by widespread politi-
cal and ideological differences. These areas of contention highlight the lack 
of agreement on the theoretical foundations of human dignity. Three main 
theoretical orientations present themselves for consideration.91
The first theoretical orientation derives from Christian and natural-law 
thinking, and stresses the inherent value of each human being. Here dignity 
is grounded either in the idea that man was created in the image of God, or in 
human reason and the capacity for self-determination and ethical autonomy. 
These theories are said to vest dignity in all human beings, regardless of their 
ability or potential. However, Hofmann notes that in the Christian conception, 
dignity tends to be conflated with biological human life, while supporters of 
the idealistic natural law variety have to resort to strained notions, such as 
the potential reasoning capacity of a person or the abilities of the human spe-
cies, to extend dignity to those who lack the mental capacity for reason and 
self-determination.92 The theological and metaphysical foundations of this 
orientation are also considered problematic in an age characterised by the 
fragmentation and pluralisation of belief systems.
The second theory views dignity as something to be achieved through a 
process of identity-building and self-actualisation, rather than as something 
already given and inherent in every human being.93 On the positive side, this 
theory is said to be free from metaphysical and theological baggage, and 
emphasises the affinity between dignity, autonomy, identity, and the struc-
tural and institutional framework (for example the social state) within which 
these goods are to be safeguarded. On the negative side, it detracts from the 
unconditional nature of human dignity, and excludes those who lack the capa-
city for reason and self-determination from its protective scope.
The third theory, known as the communicative theory, grounds dignity 
not in the qualities, capacities, potential or achievements of the individual 
human subject, but in social recognition. Dignity is conceived as a relational 
and communicative concept which can only be realised through the positive 
valuation, within a concrete community, of claims for recognition. The basis 
91 See generally Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 169-170; Häberle “Menschenwürde als Grundlage” in 
Handbuch des Staatsrechts 341, 343; and Hofmann 1993 AöR 353
92 Hofmann 1993 AöR 361
93 See Luhmann Grundrechte als Institution: ein Beitrag zur politischen Soziologie 4 ed (1999) 61ff
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of such recognition, and thus of dignity, lies in human solidarity and not in a 
specific human quality or achievement.94 This theory is attractive for a number 
of reasons. Because it grounds dignity in human intersubjectivity, rather than 
in some pre-existing human quality or in notions of individual sovereignty, 
it avoids reliance on timeless truths or essentialist understandings of the self. 
Moreover, because it appeals to solidarity as the basis of dignity, it has no 
problem recognising the dignity of those who lack the capacity for reason and 
ethical self-determination – and it does so without conflating dignity with 
biological human life.95 Finally, to the extent that it situates dignity within a 
particular (national) community, the communicative theory is better able to 
account for the boundaries against which claims for the recognition of dignity 
inevitably come up.
The last point is in need of clarification. The communicative theory starts 
from the paradox that the universal idea of dignity can only be realised within 
a concrete – and therefore particular – community based on mutual recogni-
tion. In such a community, dignity performs a constitutive role. The dignity 
clause in the German Basic Law does more than merely proclaiming a right, 
a principle or a value. It constitutes an act by means of which a national com-
munity is founded.96
Naturally, such a community is bounded, and it is not obliged to honour the 
dignity claims of those who find themselves beyond its confines. Hofmann 
illustrates this by means of two examples.97 First, a German consulate in 
Somalia is under no constitutional or legal obligation to provide food to 
starving local inhabitants. Secondly, the Federal Republic of Germany is 
not duty-bound to respond positively to the pleas of asylum-seekers who can 
demonstrate that, due to restrictions in their home country on basic economic 
and other liberties, they live under conditions that would not be regarded 
in Germany as a dignified existence – at least as long as they are not sub-
jected to more serious violations of their dignity than the general populace. 
According to Hofmann, the communicative theory is able to account for these 
limits because it emphasises the role of dignity in the founding of the state 
and grounds dignity in the communicative actions of a bounded community. 
Dignity, in his view, is rooted in a promise: in founding the state, the people 
promise to recognise each other’s autonomy, equality and individuality. This 
promise lies closer to the oath sworn by members of a medieval free city than 
to the hands-off dealings characterising the liberal social contract, with its 
abstract-individualist underpinnings. It signals solidarity with and openness 
to the other (including aliens finding themselves within the national territory), 
and a willingness to recognise the other as a singular human being. At the 
94 Hofmann 1993 AöR 363-364
95 Proponents of the communicative theory generally reject reliance on dignity in the areas of abortion and 
human reproduction  See Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 173-176, 179-202; Hofmann 1993 AöR 
376  
96 See also Häberle “Menschenwürde als Grundlage” in Handbuch des Staatsrechts 351-352 on the interplay 
between dignity and popular sovereignty, and the role of dignity in founding a democratic constitutional 
state  
97 Hofmann 1993 AöR 353.
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same time, however, this promise underlies a republic comprising German 
nationals, not a cosmopolitan society without boundaries.98
Despite the normative appeal and the realism of this theory, it must never-
theless be asked whether it does not effectively reduce dignity to the protection 
afforded to it within a particular nation-state.99 While it is true that every 
act of state-founding implies a demarcation from the outside world and thus 
constitutes an act of self-enclosure and exclusion, and while there are limits to 
the state’s capacity to honour the dignity claims of those finding themselves 
outside the national territory, much would be lost if dignity were simply to be 
reduced to the contours given to it within a positive legal order.
3 3 5  Bearers of dignity
It is uncontroversial that dignity vests in every born human person, regard-
less of a person’s bodily or mental capacity. Dignity cannot be lost through 
criminal or undignified behaviour. Also included within the scope of Article 
1(1) are aliens finding themselves within the national territory, regardless of 
whether their stay in Germany is legal or illegal. However, juristic persons are 
not protected.
The Federal Constitutional Court has held on two occasions that the unborn 
foetus is a bearer of human dignity in terms of Article 1(1). The Court held in 
its First Abortion judgment:100
“Wherever human life exists, it merits human dignity; whether the subject of this dignity is conscious 
of it and knows how to safeguard it is not of decisive moment. The potential capabilities inherent in 
human existence from its inception are adequate to establish human dignity.”101
In the Second Abortion judgment, it likewise stated:102
“Unborn human life possesses human dignity; [dignity] is not merely an attribute of a fully developed 
personality or a human being after birth”.103
In both judgments, the question whether a foetus is the bearer of human 
dignity is made to turn on the question whether it constitutes human life. 
This equation of dignity with biological life has been criticised.104 Critics 
have also argued that the idea that unborn human life is entitled to dignity 
is irreconcilable with the Court’s findings that abortions are constitutionally 
permissible under certain circumstances (for instance, when it would place 
an unreasonable social or psychological burden on the mother to require 
her to carry her foetus to term) and that non-indicated abortions in the first 
twelve weeks of pregnancy, while illegal, need not be punished. These find-
ings are said to detract from the absolute nature of the dignity guarantee, as 
98 365-373
99 Cf the criticisms of Isensee 2006 AöR 196-197, 215 (arguing that in the communicative theory, dignity is 
no longer seen as absolute and that nothing prevents a community from withdrawing its recognition of 
certain persons)
100 BVerfGE 39, 1 (1975)
101 41 (translation by Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany 338)
102 BVerfGE 88, 203 (1993)
103 251 (translation by Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany 351)
104 Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 173-174; Herdegen “Art  1 Abs  1” in Grundgesetz Kommentar 40  
See also 3 5 below
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they subject dignity to balancing with countervailing rights. In the view of 
some commentators, these findings would make more sense if the Court had 
decoupled the right to life from the dignity guarantee and based its decision 
solely upon the former.105 However, other authors argue that the coupling of 
unborn life and dignity makes good constitutional sense. On the one hand, it 
“helps to define the life of the unborn child as a life distinguished from that of 
the mother”.106 On the other, it places the duty to protect life on a more secure 
basis, as it is not yet generally accepted that the duty to protect is implied in 
all fundamental rights.107
The protection afforded in terms of Article 1(1) also extends to the deceased. 
The body of the deceased person may not be reduced to the mere object 
of medical research or to a source of organ harvesting. Personality rights 
likewise enjoy posthumous protection. In the Mephisto case,108 the Federal 
Constitutional Court upheld the decision of the court a quo in terms of which 
the right to publish a novel which dishonoured the memory of a deceased 
person found its limits in the dignity of the deceased person. However, the 
protection afforded to the personality rights of the deceased is temporally 
bound. This is best explained in terms of the communicative theory with its 
emphasis on the mutual recognition of identity and self-worth. As time goes 
by, the memory of the deceased fades, and the protection of a person’s dignity 
diminishes accordingly.109
A controversial issue is whether dignity attaches only to concrete individu-
als or whether it can also be used to protect the dignity of humanity in the 
abstract. This is particularly topical in debates about bio-ethical questions 
relating to pre-implantation diagnostics or cloning. Because it is often difficult 
to find a violation of the dignity of an individual, it is argued that such prac-
tices impair the dignity of humanity, the human species, or those members of 
society who see in them something deeply dehumanising. Such recourse to 
collective notions of dignity has been criticised. It is argued that these notions 
are essentialist; that they are inconsistent with the plurality characterising 
modern polities; that they are invoked to preclude debate about contentious 
social issues by relying upon a constitutional norm which is shielded even 
from constitutional amendment; and that they are often used in conjunction 
with arguments that are speculative and border on the hysterical.110
3 4  Dignity and democracy
Dignity and popular sovereignty are viewed as the foundations of the 
German constitutional state. However, as Häberle points out, these two con-
cepts are usually separated in constitutional thought.111 Of course, it is not 
105 Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 174-176
106 Klein “Human Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer & Klein (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in 
Human Rights Discourse (2002) 154
107 154
108 BVerfGE 30, 173 196 (1971)
109 Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 178-179; Hofmann 1993 AöR 375-376
110 Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 203-205
111 Häberle “Menschenwürde als Grundlage” in Handbuch des Staatsrechts 350
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difficult to see why dignity is seen to stand in an uneasy relationship with 
popular sovereignty. Not only is dignity regarded as the basis of human rights 
(Article 1(2)) which bind the democratically elected legislature, but dignity 
itself is constitutionally entrenched as absolute and beyond even the legisla-
ture’s authority to revise the Basic Law. Dignity thus sets definite limits to the 
sovereignty of the people. And traditionally, popular sovereignty is conceived, 
in the tradition of Rousseau, as absolute and indivisible.112
However, a few authors have insisted upon a connection between dignity 
and democracy. On the one hand, they claim that dignity is not merely a sub-
jective right or individualistic entitlement, but is constitutive of a political 
community of equals.113 On the other hand, they maintain that the constitu-
tional commitment to popular sovereignty must be reconceived in view of the 
constitutional commitment to human dignity. Häberle argues convincingly 
that “the people” should not be understood as a natural or mystical pre-given, 
but as a pluralistic entity which consists of citizens who are each vested with 
their own dignity and worth.114 Read together, the constitutional principles of 
dignity and democracy presuppose a polity which embraces the worth of each 
concrete individual. Accordingly, plurality and difference are regarded as 
democracy-enhancing, rather than as something to be overcome in the name 
of the general will.
In this view, dignity implies equal citizenship, and thus the right of the 
individual to participate in processes of collective deliberation and decision-
making. The norm of dignity does not in itself dictate a particular form of 
democracy; it is, for instance, compatible both with representative and plebi-
scitary forms of democracy. However, it is violated where a particular group 
of citizens are excluded from the right to vote, or are denied basic freedoms 
(eg freedom of expression, assembly or demonstration) which are fundamen-
tal to democratic processes of deliberation and will-formation. In these cases, 
individuals are reduced to objects of the political process, instead of being 
treated as citizens who are capable of self-determination. Moreover, they are 
excluded from a political community based on mutual recognition, and thus 
denied the right to exercise their autonomy and to shape their own identities in 
communication with others.115
Underlying Häberle’s account of the link between dignity and democracy 
is the understanding that dignity is not exclusively concerned with private 
autonomy. In this vision, public and private autonomy are closely interlinked. 
112 The idea that dignity is at odds with democracy is strengthened by judgments in which freedom of expres-
sion, which is so vital to the democratic process, was construed narrowly in relation to the rights to 
honour and reputation  The Mephisto judgment (BVerfGE 30, 173 (1971)), in which the Court upheld the 
banning of a satirical novel on the ground that it dishonoured the good name and memory of a deceased 
actor upon whose life the main character was based, is open to this criticism  However, the judgment in 
Lüth (BVerfGE 7, 198 (1958)) shows that a dignity-based constitutional jurisprudence need not result in a 
dilution of democratic freedoms  In Lüth, the Court held that dignity is at the centre of the constitutional 
value order (205), but at the same time made it clear that, as far as the formation of public opinion relating 
to questions that are central to the public good is concerned, private and individual economic interests 
must recede into the background (219)
113 See the discussion of the communicative theory under 3 3 4 above
114 Häberle “Menschenwürde als Grundlage” in Handbuch des Staatsrechts 351-352
115 353
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Private rights are best secured through a pluralistic public sphere which is 
characterised by tolerance of cultural and religious differences and the free 
exchange of multiple and conflicting viewpoints. At the same time, however, 
such a public sphere presupposes respect for private freedoms and a protected 
sphere of intimacy.
3 5  Limitation
Dignity, as noted above, is given absolute protection under the Basic Law. 
According to Article 1(1), dignity shall be “inviolable”. This has been taken to 
mean that no person’s inherent human dignity can be taken away: paradoxi-
cally, even where a person’s human dignity is violated by means of torture or 
ostracism, she does not thereby lose her dignity.116 Moreover, a person can 
neither waive her dignity, nor forfeit it through undignified behavior.
Significantly, no provision is made for the limitation of dignity by or in 
terms of legislation. Consequently, dignity may not be weighed up with other 
constitutional rights or with the public interest.117 Unlike other constitutional 
rights which contain limiting provisos, dignity is viewed as absolute – a find-
ing that someone’s dignity has been infringed is conclusive of the matter, 
as such a violation cannot be justified on the basis that it is proportionate to 
the achievement of an important government objective, or that such person’s 
dignity is outweighed by other, more pressing considerations.118
The notion that dignity is not subject to balancing has, however, come under 
pressure. Because dignity is seen as the basis of human rights and because it 
is so often used in conjunction with more specific rights, dignity sometimes 
features on both sides of a dispute. In cases where dignity conflicts with dig-
nity, a court has no choice but to engage in balancing. In the abortion cases, 
the Federal Constitutional Court weighed up the life and dignity of the foetus 
against the self-determination and dignity of the mother.119 Similar conflicts 
occur where a person consents to treatment (for example, in the case of “peep 
shows” and “dwarf tossing”) which is considered to be objectifying and 
116 The Federal Constitutional Court distinguishes between the claim to basic social respect, which may be 
violated, and the inherent dignity of the person, which cannot be lost  BVerfGE 87, 209 228 (1992)
117 Fundamental rights may only be limited by, or in terms of, legislation, to the extent that the legislature 
is granted such power by the Basic Law itself  Many of the fundamental rights provisions contain such 
limiting provisos (Gesetzesvorbehalte or statutory reservations). For instance, the rights to life, bodily 
integrity and personal freedom may be limited in terms of legislation, while freedom of expression may 
be limited by a law of general application (Art 5(2))  Sometimes, the Basic Law spells out the conditions 
under which a right may be limited – see eg Art 11(2)  In so far as a fundamental right provision authorizes 
limitations by or in terms of legislation, the provisions of Arts 19(1) and (2) must be complied with  Art 
19(1) provides that the legislation must apply generally and not to an individual case only  It must also 
mention the fundamental right provision which is limited  In terms of Art 19(2), the essential content of 
a right may not be infringed  The Constitutional Court has used this provision to develop a test based 
on proportionality and balancing  See generally Häberle Die Wesensgehaltgarantie des Art. 19 Abs. 2 
Grundgesetz 3 ed (1983); Hesse Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 20 
ed (1999) 139-144, 147-150
118 In the case of other rights, the fundamental rights inquiry proceeds in two stages: first, the court inquires 
into the scope and meaning of the right and second, it determines whether the limitation of the right, if 
any, is constitutional  In the case of dignity, however, only the first inquiry may take place  Thus, Dreier 
notes that dignity’s scope of protection is identical to its outer limits  Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 
1210
119 BVerfGE 39, 1 (1975); BVerfGE 88, 203 (1993)
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degrading. Here the state’s duty to protect dignity – if needs be, even against 
self-degradation – conflicts with the autonomy and right of the individual to 
self-determination.120 While some commentators regard these conflicts as 
exceptional,121 others believe that they are far more common than previously 
imagined. It has even been argued that the right not to be tortured – always 
considered to be at the heart of the dignity guarantee – is not absolute, that 
there are circumstances in which it is outweighed by the dignity of others, and 
that in such cases the state is under an obligation to torture a person in order 
to save the lives of innocent persons.122
In a recent case,123 the Federal Constitutional Court had to decide the con-
stitutionality of legislation which, as a direct consequence of the 9/11 attacks 
in the United States, authorized the security forces to shoot down an aircraft 
which was to be used to destroy human life. The Court held that the legislation 
was unconstitutional to the extent that it authorized the killing of innocent 
victims (cabin crew and passengers), as it reduced them to helpless objects 
of the state’s attempts to protect others and thus disregarded their quality as 
subjects. The Court refused to balance the dignity of the victims against the 
lives of others who may be saved in the process. However, it found that the 
shooting down of an aircraft with only terrorists on board would not violate 
the terrorists’ dignity, and that the infringement of their right to life was pro-
portionate to the protection of innocent lives.124
Despite the Court’s refusal in the air safety case to relativize dignity, the 
question remains whether it is tenable to cling to an absolute conception of 
dignity. According to one commentator, the ever more frequent collisions 
of dignity against dignity and the increasing use of dignity to gain the 
upper hand in political and ideological battles mark the end of interpretive 
innocence and endanger the idea of dignity as something absolute.125 A 
number of interpretive strategies have been employed in trying to come 
to terms with the perceived threats to dignity’s normative status. One is 
to economize on the use of dignity in an attempt to restore it to its role 
as the centre of the constitutional value order and as the foundation of all 
human rights, rather than as a subjective right to be weighed up against 
other rights and interests.126 The problem with this strategy is that it cannot 
avoid collisions between dignity and dignity. It can try to minimize such 
collisions by giving dignity a restrictive interpretation, but this carries the 
risk of reducing dignity to a too narrow category. A second strategy is to 
avoid relying on dignity in areas such as abortion, reproductive technology 
and stem cell research, which are characterized by deep and widespread 
social disagreement.127 This strategy seeks to withdraw dignity from a 
120 See the references to BVerfGE 64, 274 (1981) at 3 2 and 3 3 2 above
121 Dreier Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 1210
122 Brugger “Vom unbedingten Verbot der Folter zum bedingten Recht auf Folter?” 2000 JuristenZeitung 
165
123 BVerfGE 115, 118 (2006)
124 151-165
125 Isensee 2006 AöR 194-199
126 See the discussion and references to literature under 3 2 above
127 See the discussion and references to literature under 3 3 1 above
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number of intractable value conflicts; however, other areas of deep-seated 
social disagreement (eg conflicts between cultural and religious freedom, 
on the one hand, and individual autonomy and equality, on the other) 
remain from which dignity can hardly be extracted. Moreover, the attempt 
to withdraw dignity from such debates raises questions about its capacity 
to provide orientation on some of the most vexing legal-ethical questions 
facing contemporary society, and is open to the objection that it is itself 
informed by a particular political and ideological agenda.
Other authors have given up on the idea of dignity as absolute, and dis-
tinguish instead between a core of human dignity which is absolute and 
unlimited, and a periphery which is open to balancing.128 While this approach 
appears to be more realistic than attempts to insulate dignity altogether from 
balancing, it is itself riddled with difficulties. The difficulty of defining the 
core and distinguishing it from the periphery, and the danger of subjecting 
vital aspects of a person’s dignity to balancing explain the resistance which 
this approach still encounters.
4  Dignity in South African constitutional law
4 1  Textual and historical setting
Section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 
of 1993 (“the interim Constitution”) provides that “[e]very person shall have 
the right to respect for and protection of his or her dignity.” This provision 
borrows from German law the notion that dignity must both be respected and 
protected. However, it does not, on the face of it, emulate Article 1(1) of the 
German Basic Law in placing dignity in a privileged position vis-à-vis other 
rights and values. Unlike Article 1(1), section 10 is not the first provision deal-
ing with fundamental rights; other rights provisions are not said to flow from 
it; nothing is said about the inviolability of dignity; it is subject to limitation; 
and, like the rest of the Constitution, can be amended with a two thirds major-
ity of the members of the National Assembly and Senate, sitting jointly.129 It 
may therefore appear as if dignity is just one right among many protected in 
the interim Constitution. There are, however, textual and structural features 
which resist this reading. First of all, dignity is closely related to a number 
of other rights entrenched in the interim Constitution, such as equality, life, 
freedom and security of the person, the right not to be tortured and not to be 
subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, privacy and 
freedom of religion. Secondly, even though section 33, the general limitation 
clause, applies to all constitutionally entrenched rights, limitations of dignity 
and a number of the rights closely associated with it have to comply with a 
stricter standard: in addition to being reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on freedom and equality, such limitations also 
128 See Herdegen “Art  1 Abs  1” in Grundgesetz Kommentar 27-34
129 S 62(1)
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need to be necessary.130 Thirdly, dignity and a number of the rights closely 
associated with it may not be suspended during a state of emergency.131
That the Constitutional Court did not regard section 10 of the interim 
Constitution as expressing just one right among many was already clear in 
S v Makwanyane,132 in which the Court described dignity, together with the 
right to life, as “the most important of all human rights, and the source of 
all other personal rights” in the Bill of Rights.133 Drawing on comparative 
case law to illuminate the affinity between dignity and other rights, the Court 
soon employed dignity as a guide to the interpretation of many of the rights 
enshrined in the interim Constitution.134 Underpinning this vision of dignity 
as a supreme value and interpretive Leitmotiv were a variety of considerations. 
These include the role of dignity in international and comparative constitu-
tional law,135 the affinity between human dignity and the indigenous concept of 
ubuntu,136 and the idea that dignity provides a neutral, principled basis for the 
mediation of conflicts between equality and freedom.137 Another factor which 
seems to have weighed particularly heavily with the Court was its understand-
ing that the evil of apartheid consisted first and foremost in the systematic 
denial of the inherent dignity and worth of the majority of the population. As 
O’Regan J stated in an oft-quoted passage in S v Makwanyane:138
“Respect for the dignity of all human beings is particularly important in South Africa. For apartheid 
was a denial of a common humanity. Black people were refused respect and dignity and thereby the 
dignity of all South Africans was diminished. The new Constitution rejects this past and affirms the 
equal worth of all South Africans. Thus recognition and protection of human dignity is the touchstone 
of the new political order and is fundamental to the new Constitution.”139
The final Constitution embraces this vision and lends further textual sup-
port to the idea that dignity occupies a special place in the new constitutional 
order. The new section 10 provides that “[everyone] has inherent dignity and 
the right to have their dignity respected and protected.” By recognising the 
inherent dignity of every person, the section puts it beyond any doubt that 
dignity accrues to all persons, that it is not dependent on particular character-
istics, and that it can neither be waived nor lost through undignified behaviour. 
It could even be argued that the reference to the “inherent dignity” of every 
130 S 33(1)(b)(aa)  These include the right to freedom and security of the person (s 11(1)); the right not to be 
tortured and the right not to be subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (s 11(2)); 
the right not to be subject to servitude and forced labour (s 12); the right to freedom of religion, belief and 
opinion (s 14(1)); and the rights of detained, arrested and accused persons (s 25)
131 S 34(5)(c)
132 1995 3 SA 391 (CC), 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC)
133 Para 144
134 See 4 2 below
135 Ackermann 2000 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 537 539-540 n 4; Chaskalson “The Third 
Bram Fischer Lecture: Human Dignity as a Foundational Value of our Constitutional Order” 2000 SAJHR 
193 196-198  
136 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC), 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) paras 224-225, 307-313  See also Cornell 
“A Call for a Nuanced Constitutional Jurisprudence: Ubuntu, Dignity, and Reconciliation” 2004 SA 
Public Law 666
137 Ackermann 2000 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 554-556
138 1995 3 SA 391 (CC), 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC)
139 Para 329  See also Dawood; Shalabi; Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC), 2000 8 
BCLR 837 (CC) para 35; Ackermann 2000 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 540-542
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person has a similar meaning to the declaration in the German Basic Law 
that dignity is “inviolable”, and that it serves to give absolute protection to an 
inner core of dignity. On this interpretation, section 10 does not simply confer 
a subjective right which, like all rights, is subject to limitation. In addition to 
conferring a right, it also declares the belief of the founders of the Constitution 
that the dignity of the person exists prior to its recognition in a constitution 
and that, accordingly, the negation of the inherent dignity of the person – in 
distinction to limitations of the right to have one’s dignity respected and pro-
tected – cannot be justified in the name of countervailing interests.140
Dignity also features prominently in other constitutional provisions. Section 
1(a) proclaims that the Republic of South Africa is founded, inter alia, on the 
values of “human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancements 
of human rights and freedoms”. Although not completely shielded from 
constitutional amendment, section 1 is more strongly entrenched than the rest 
of the Constitution, requiring the assent of 75% of the members of the National 
Assembly and six of the nine provinces in the National Council of Provinces.141 
A constitutional amendment which violates the value of human dignity would 
thus be subject to this heightened majority. Section 7(1) states that the Bill of 
Rights “affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom”; 
section 36(1) states that fundamental rights may only be limited to the extent that 
the limitation is “reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom”; and section 39(1) enjoins the 
interpreters of the Bill of Rights to “promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom”. In addition, 
section 35(2)(e) recognises the right of every detained person to “conditions of 
detention that are consistent with human dignity”.
4 2  Dignity as a right, a value, and a guide to interpretation
Unlike Article 1 of the German Basic Law, section 10 of the South African 
Constitution expressly confers a justiciable and enforceable right to human 
dignity.142 However, the Constitutional Court has made it clear that a breach of 
the right to dignity will not be found in every case in which the value of dignity 
is offended. Where “the primary constitutional breach” is of a “more specific 
right”,143 the Court will generally focus on that right. Dignity thus assumes the 
role of a residual right which is used to interpret and give shape to more specific 
rights, and which is relied upon directly only in cases in which no more specific 
right is available.144 The Court has, however, not been entirely consistent in this 
140 See Venter “Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value: a South African Perspective” in Ipsen (ed) Recht, 
Staat, Gemeinwohl: Festschrift für Dietrich Rauschning (2001) 335 (arguing that s 10 does not establish a 
right to human dignity, but recognizes dignity as “an inalienable, inborn characteristic of each individual 
person” (340))
141 S 74(1)
142 Dawood; Shalabi; Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC), 2000 8 BCLR 837 (CC) 
para 35
143 Para 36
144 See Woolman “Dignity” in Woolman, Roux, Klaaren, Stein & Chaskalson (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa 2 ed (2005) 36-19–36-25 for an analysis of the various ways in which dignity has been used 
by the courts
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regard. Sometimes, it relies on dignity as a value which informs the interpre-
tation of more specific rights, without engaging the right to dignity. At other 
times, it invokes the right to dignity along with other rights. In some of these 
cases, an independent finding of a violation of the right to dignity, in addition to 
other rights, is made.145 In others, the right to dignity is invoked to strengthen 
some other right, which is treated as the primary right.146 Here, the intersec-
tion of different rights is used to mark out areas in which a particularly cogent 
justification would be needed for their limitation.147
The Constitutional Court has described dignity as the “cornerstone of 
human rights”148 and as “a value that informs the interpretation of many, pos-
sibly all, other rights”.149 Among the rights that have been interpreted in view 
of the value of human dignity are equality,150 the guarantee against cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment,151 personal freedom,152 privacy,153 free-
dom of religion,154 freedom of expression,155 the right to vote,156 freedom of 
145 The Court often finds a violation of both ss 9 (equality and non-discrimination) and 10  See eg National 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC), 1998 12 BCLR 1517 (CC); 
Bhe v Magistrate Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; SA Human Rights Commission v President of the RSA 
2005 1 SA 563 (CC), 2005 1 BCLR 1 (CC); Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality 
Project v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 3 BCLR 355 (CC), 2006 1 SA 524 (CC)
146 In the majority judgment in S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC), 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC), Chaskalson P 
relied on the rights to life, equality and dignity to support his finding that the death penalty violates the 
right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment  However, he found it unneces-
sary to decide whether the death penalty directly infringed these rights  In Khosa v Minister of Social 
Development; Mahlaule v Minster of Social Development 2004 6 SA 505 (CC), 2004 6 BCLR 569 (CC), 
Mokgoro J held that the rights to life and dignity were implicated in the exclusion of permanent residents 
from social security benefits  Despite using the language of rights rather than values, she still appeared 
to treat the right of access to social security as the primary right which must be interpreted in view of the 
rights to life and dignity (para 44)  Having found a breach of s 27(1)(c), she then proceeded to find that the 
breach also constituted unfair discrimination
147 Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minster of Social Development 2004 6 SA 505 
(CC), 2004 6 BCLR 569 (CC) para 41 (different rights often “reinforce one another at the point of 
intersection”)  
148 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC), 2000 10 BCLR 1051 (CC) 
para 36
149 Dawood; Shalabi; Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC), 2000 8 BCLR 837 (CC) 
para 35
150 Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 3 SA 1012 (CC), 1997 6 BCLR 759 (CC) paras 31-33; President of the 
Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC), 1997 6 BCLR 708 (CC) para 41; Harksen v Lane NO 
1998 1 SA 300 (CC), 1997 11 BCLR 1489 (CC) paras 46, 50, 51, 53, 91, 92
151 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC), 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC); S v Williams 1995 3 SA 632 (CC), 1995 7 
BCLR 861 (CC); S v Dodo 2001 3 SA 382 (CC), 2001 5 BCLR 423 (CC) para 35
152 Ferreira v Levin NO and Vryenhoek v Powell NO 1996 1 SA 984 (CC), 1996 1 BCLR 1 (CC) para 49 (per 
Ackermann J)
153 Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 2 SA 751 (CC), 1996 4 BCLR 449 (CC) paras 65-67; National Coalition for 
Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC), 1998 12 BCLR 1517 (CC) paras 30, 120; 
Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 
2000 10 BCLR 1079 (CC) para 18; NM v Smith (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2007 
5 SA 250 (CC), 2007 7 BCLR 751 (CC) paras 131-132
154 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC), 2000 10 BCLR 1051 
(CC) para 36; Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 2002 2 SA 794 (CC), 2002 
3 BCLR 231 (CC) paras 48-51; Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v 
Minister of Home Affairs 2006 1 SA 524 (CC), 2006 3 BCLR 355 (CC) para 89
155 South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 4 SA 469 (CC), 1999 6 BCLR 615 
(CC) paras 7, 8; Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC), 2002 8 BCLR 771 (CC) para 21; South African 
Broadcasting Corporation v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 2 BCLR 167 (CC) para 120; 
NM v Smith (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2007 5 SA 250 (CC), 2007 7 BCLR 751 
(CC) para 145
156 August v Electoral Commission 1999 3 SA 1 (CC), 1999 4 BCLR 363 (CC) para 17
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occupation,157 property,158 socio-economic rights such as access to adequate 
housing and social security,159 cultural life,160 the right to a fair trial,161 and the 
presumption of innocence.162
Dignity has also been invoked as a guide to the interpretation of legisla-
tion163 and the development of the common law. The Constitutional Court 
held in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security164 that the Constitution, 
like the German Basic Law, embodies “an objective, normative value system” 
which must guide the development of all areas of law.165 Rejecting the argu-
ment that the Bill of Rights only requires the state to refrain from infringing 
the rights entrenched in it, the Court held that in appropriate circumstances, 
the state has a positive duty to protect the rights to life, dignity, and freedom 
and security of the person.166 Both the High Court and Supreme Court of 
Appeal had failed to consider the impact of the Constitution on the common-
law test for determining the wrongfulness of omissions on the part of the state. 
The matter was then referred back to the High Court to determine whether 
and how the common law should be developed. This set in motion a train of 
legal developments which gave rise to the delictual liability of the state for 
failures by prosecutors and police to take reasonable steps to protect the safety 
of citizens.167
4 3  The scope and meaning of dignity
4 3 1  Interpretive difficulties
Human dignity has presented constitutional interpreters in South Africa 
with a means of negotiating some of the contradictions lying at the heart 
of the constitutional order. The notion of inherent human dignity invokes a 
universal ideal which transcends national boundaries, yet resonates closely 
157 Minister of Home Affairs v Watchenuka 2004 4 SA 326 (SCA), 2004 2 BCLR 120 (SCA) paras 27, 32  The 
respondents, who were asylum seekers, could not rely directly on s 22, which reserves the right to freedom 
of occupation to South African citizens  The Court nevertheless held that their right to human dignity was 
violated in cases where they had no other sources of income or support
158 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC), 2004 12 BCLR 1268 (CC) 
para 15
159 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC), 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) 
paras 23, 44, 83; Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) para 21; Khosa v Minister 
of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minster of Social Development 2004 6 SA 505 (CC), 2004 6 BCLR 
569 (CC) paras 41, 44
160 MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC), 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC) paras 53, 62-66, 
150, 155-157, 177  
161 Jaipal v S 2005 4 SA 581 (CC), 2005 5 BCLR 423 (CC) para 26
162 S v Manamela (Director-General of Justice Intervening) 2000 3 SA 1 (CC), 2000 5 BCLR 491 (CC) 
para 40
163 Daniels v Campbell NO 2004 5 SA 331 (CC), 2004 7 BCLR 735 (CC) para 54
164 2001 4 SA 938 (CC), 2001 10 BCLR 995 (CC)
165 Para 54, with reference to BVerfGE 39, 1 41 (1975)  
166 Para 44
167 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 2 SA 656 (C), 2002 10 BCLR 1100 (C) para 31; 
Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA); Van Eeden v Minister of Safety 
and Security 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA)  See also Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 
2005 2 SA 359 (CC), 2005 4 BCLR 301 (CC) (recognising the positive duty of the responsible organ of 
state to take reasonable measures to provide for the security of rail commuters)
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with the anti-apartheid struggle. Its entrenchment as an individual right and a 
founding value signals a decisive break with South Africa’s racist, sexist and 
authoritarian past, yet establishes a measure of continuity with the protec-
tion afforded at common law to the individual’s reputation and dignitas. In 
addition, dignity’s proximity to a range of rights and values – equality and 
freedom, sameness and difference, individuality and community, and so forth 
– suggests the possibility of a reasoned dialogue over seemingly intractable 
value conflicts.168 Dignity, it seems, provides a shared vocabulary which links 
the universality of human rights to local historical struggles, spans the divide 
between the old and the new legal order, and enables the mediation of conflict-
ing constitutional values.
There are, however, dangers in using dignity as a device for the negotiation 
of constitutional conflicts. First, dignity could be used as the centrepiece of 
a narrative which overemphasises the break between the old and the new, 
which legitimates continuing inequality and degradation in the name of the 
Constitution’s promise of universal human dignity.169 Secondly, the apparent 
affinity between the constitutional language of human dignity and the common 
law concepts of reputation and dignitas could easily result in a constitutional 
jurisprudence which underestimates the break between the old and the new. 
Constitutional dignity may be uncritically conflated with individual honour; 
personality rights may be privileged over countervailing interests like freedom 
of expression, which are just as vital to the dignity and autonomy of the human 
person; and classical-liberal assumptions about individual choice and consent 
may find their way back into the deliberations of a Court which has publicly 
disavowed these beliefs.170 And thirdly, dignity may become so saturated with 
meaning that it would simply replicate the tensions it is supposed to mediate. 
It may thus turn into a mechanism for leafing over, rather than engaging 
constitutional value conflicts.
Dignity is a remarkably rich and evocative concept. Its plasticity, proximity 
to a range of constitutional rights and values, and affinity with a variety of 
legal and philosophical traditions makes it a powerful tool of constitutional 
analysis, consensus building and transformation. It is these very same quali-
ties, however, which raise doubts over its capacity to constrain legal meaning 
and explain constitutional judgments. The remainder of this section focuses 
on the interpretations given to dignity by South African courts and the ways 
in which these interpretations navigate a variety of tensions – between the 
objective and subjective dimensions of dignity, between the individual and 
the community, and between different theoretical perspectives on the scope 
and meaning of dignity.
168 Cf Ackermann 2000 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 540-542 and the comments of O’Regan J 
in MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC), 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC) para 156 
(invoking the value of dignity as the “lodestar” which should guide us in our negotiation of cultural 
diversity)
169 See Botha “Equality, Plurality, and Structural Power” 2009 SAJHR (forthcoming)
170 See Barrett “Dignatio and the Human Body” 2005 SAJHR 525
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4 3 2  Mere objects and autonomous subjects
As in Germany, the idea that human dignity precludes treating individu-
als as mere objects or means to an end has found favour with the courts.171 
In Makwanyane, it was found that the death penalty places the offender 
“beyond the pale of humanity”.172 It erases the possibility of rehabilitation and 
self-improvement, “instrumentalises the offender for the objectives of State 
policy”,173 and “dehumanises the person and objectifies him or her as a tool for 
crime control”.174 Similarly, the Court stated in Dodo175 that the imposition of 
a disproportionately severe sentence would amount to treating the offender as 
a means to an end. This would be
“to ignore, if not to deny, that which lies at the very heart of human dignity. Human beings are not 
commodities to which a price can be attached; they are creatures with inherent and infinite worth; they 
ought to be treated as ends in themselves, never merely as means to an end.”176
The object formulation has also been applied outside the context of judicial 
sentencing.177 It has been held that an accused person should, as far as possible, 
“be viewed by the court not as a criminal, a dangerous character, or a threat, 
but as a person whose guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt”.178 In 
Coetzee v Comitis179 the regulations of the National Soccer League, in terms 
of which a player is not allowed to transfer to another club upon the termina-
tion of his contract unless a transfer fee is paid, were also found to infringe 
the player’s human dignity. The Court pointed out that the player was treated 
as an object: he did not have any say in respect of the transfer fee, and was 
ultimately “at the mercy of an arbitrator who determines the compensation 
payable according to a formula for which there is no rational basis”.180
Sexual exploitation and degradation are also areas in which the object for-
mulation has found application. It has been held, for instance, that children 
171 Although reference has been made in this context to the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional 
Court (see the reference in S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC), 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) para 59 to 
BVerfGE 45, 187 228 (1977)), North American case law seems to have exerted a more direct influence  
Justice William Brennan’s – and some other judges’ – resort to the object formulation in interpreting the 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution has been particularly influential  See S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC), 
1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) paras 57-58, 178, 271; S v Williams 1995 3 SA 632 (CC), 1995 7 BCLR 861 (CC) 
para 28  Reference has also been made to Canadian case law – see S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC), 
1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) para 60
172 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC), 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) para 271
173 Para 313
174 Para 316
175 S v Dodo 2001 3 SA 382 (CC), 2001 5 BCLR 423 (CC)
176 Para 38
177 In relation to sentencing, see also S v Dodo 2001 3 BCLR 279 (E) (mandatory minimum life sentence 
amounts to “de-individualisation” of offenders and negates the “capacity of the individual for self-
improvement and redemption” 299G-H); S v Tcoeib 1996 7 BCLR 996 (NmS) (Namibian Supreme Court 
holding that a sentence of life imprisonment would not be constitutional if it amounted to “an order 
throwing the prisoner into a cell for the rest of the prisoner’s natural life as if he was a ‘thing’ instead of 
a person without any continuing duty to respect his dignity” 1005G-H)
178 S v Phiri 2005 2 SACR 476 (T) para 15  The Court set aside the proceedings in the lower court where the 
accused had pleaded while in leg irons
179 2001 1 SA 1254 (C), 2001 4 BCLR 323 (C)
180 Para 34
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are objectified and degraded by child pornography;181 that the possession by a 
newspaper of photographs of persons involved in intimate sexual acts leaves 
them “at the mercy of another” and violates their dignity and privacy;182 and, 
in Jordan v S,183 that the human body is devalued as a result of its commodi-
fication through prostitution.184 This is, however, treacherous terrain. The 
finding in Jordan that the diminution of the prostitute’s dignity arises from 
her own conduct, rather than from a law which criminalises the conduct of 
the prostitute but not that of the patron, has been particularly controversial. 
This judgment raises important questions about autonomy, choice, the right 
of the individual to deviate from widely shared sexual mores, and the role of 
the law in sustaining systemic disadvantage.185 The same goes for the claim 
made in a judgment of the High Court that bestiality is “so repugnant to and 
in conflict with human dignity as to amount to perversion of the natural order” 
and that the state is under an obligation to “prevent any individual or group 
from descending to the level of the beast”.186 The reliance here on dignity 
– understood objectively – as the basis for the justification of the criminalisa-
tion of bestiality, risks reducing the scope of personal and sexual autonomy 
and conflating dignity with dignified behaviour. Moreover, the link made 
between dignity and the “natural order” is particularly unfortunate, as it tends 
to naturalise dominant assumptions about what constitutes “normal” sexual 
behaviour.
The idea that no one is to be treated as a mere object shades naturally and 
almost imperceptibly into the notion of equal dignity. Women are not to be 
treated as perpetual minors on account of their gender,187 gays and lesbians 
are not to be treated as second-class citizens or as being incapable of forming 
meaningful intimate relationships,188 non-citizens are not to be reduced to the 
role of supplicants,189 and no-one is to be treated as incapable of autonomous 
choice or of administering their own affairs by virtue of irrelevant character-
istics like race, religion or marital status.
The idea of each individual as an end in herself who has inherent 
human worth also extends to “respect for the unique set of ends” of each 
individual.190 This requires more than the prohibition of objectifying 
treatment or the notion of equal dignity. It also demands the creation of 
a space within which individuals are free to forge their own autonomous 
181 De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local Division) 2004 1 SA 406 (CC), 2003 
12 BCLR 1333 (CC) para 63
182 Prinsloo v RCP Media Ltd t/a Rapport 2003 4 SA 456 (T) 468E-I
183 2002 6 SA 642 (CC), 2002 11 BCLR 1117 (CC)
184 Para 74
185 See Botha “Equality, Dignity, and the Politics of Interpretation” 2004 SA Public Law 724 725-728, 746
186 Per Heher J in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1998 6 BCLR 726 
(W) 751B-D; endorsed in S v M 2004 1 BCLR 97 (O) paras 15, 24
187 Bhe v Magistrate Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; SA Human Rights Commission v President of the RSA 2005 
1 SA 563 (CC), 2005 1 BCLR 1 (CC) para 92
188 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC), 1998 12 BCLR 
1517 (CC) paras 127-129, 134; Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v 
Minister of Home Affairs 2006 1 SA 524 (CC), 2006 3 BCLR 355 (CC) paras 15, 17, 60, 71
189 Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 6 SA 505 
(CC), 2004 6 BCLR 569 (CC) para 76
190 MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC), 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC) para 64
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identities. Sometimes this may require differential treatment when a general 
legal rule places undue restrictions on the capacity of the individual to 
realise her own ends.
Not every restriction on the autonomy of the individual amounts to an 
impermissible limitation of her dignity. In Minister of Home Affairs v 
Watchenuka,191 the Supreme Court of Appeal distinguished between a restric-
tion upon the asylum seeker’s “capacity for self-fulfilment” and a restriction 
upon her ability to live “without positive humiliation and degradation”.192 
Restricting the right to self-fulfilment of an asylum seeker who is capable of 
supporting herself is, in the Court’s opinion, not unreasonable and unjustifi-
able. However, where a person is destitute, the effect of the prohibition would 
be to degrade her by forcing her to beg or steal. Such an invasion of her inher-
ent dignity can hardly be justified.
Dignity, then, presupposes a sphere of personal autonomy, yet is not syn-
onymous with individual freedom and self-fulfilment. Whether an invasion 
of human dignity will be found in a given instance will depend on a number 
of factors. These include, most crucially, whether the restrictive measure 
objectifies or degrades the human person and whether and to what extent it 
inhibits the capacity of the individual to forge an autonomous identity and to 
form intimate relationships. Here, spatial metaphors are used to define a core 
of personal autonomy, the invasion of which goes to the very heart of human 
dignity, and areas of individual freedom and self-fulfilment which are further 
removed from a core of individual autonomy, identity and self-worth, and thus 
more open to legitimate limitations.193
4 3 3  Individual and community
The South African Constitutional Court, like its German counterpart, has 
disavowed the idea of dignity as attaching to atomic individuals. In the view 
of the Court:
“community rights and the rights of fellow members place a corresponding obligation on a citizen, 
thereby shaping the abstract notion of individualism towards identifying a concrete member of civil 
society”.194
The Court has recognised the importance of the family to individual 
dignity and wellbeing,195 and acknowledged the centrality of religion and 
culture to the identity and dignity of the person.196 It has also tied dignity 
to the indigenous African concept of ubuntu, which refers to broad notions 
191 2004 4 SA 326 (SCA), 2004 2 BCLR 120 (SCA)
192 Para 32
193 See 4 5 below
194 Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 2 SA 751 (CC), 1996 4 BCLR 449 (CC) para 67
195 Dawood; Shalabi; Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC), 2000 8 BCLR 837 (CC) 
para 30, 37; Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home 
Affairs 2006 1 SA 524 (CC), 2006 3 BCLR 355 (CC)
196 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC), 2000 10 BCLR 1051 (CC) 
para 36; Bhe v Magistrate Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; SA Human Rights Commission v President of the 
RSA 2005 1 SA 563 (CC), 2005 1 BCLR 1 (CC)
204 STELL LR 2009 2
       
of human solidarity, respect and interdependence.197 These attempts to tie 
dignity to communitarian and solidaristic notions of interdependence and 
mutual respect have been controversial. The Court’s reliance on ubuntu 
has been criticised, inter alia, for romanticising traditional African values, 
uncritically conflating them with contemporary constitutional norms, and 
negating the conflict inherent in a pluralistic society. It is feared that ubuntu, 
with its appeal to broad notions of interdependence and societal harmony, 
might be used to obscure disagreement and difference and to induce con-
formity to dominant mindsets.198
It could be argued, however, that ubuntu need not foster a form of 
collectivism which stifles individual autonomy and difference, but can help to 
resist what Justice Sachs has called the “hydraulic insistence on conformity” 
to dominant cultural and religious norms.199 The work of Drucilla Cornell and 
others on ubuntu suggests that it could open up a rich reservoir of alternative 
understandings which, rather than suppressing difference, could be used 
to challenge dominant conceptions of the self and community.200 Because 
these dominant conceptions are widely identified with Western notions 
of “individualism”, they tend to be taken for granted in a constitutional 
democracy in which the equality and autonomy of the individual take centre 
stage. Obscured from view, however, is the fact that these understandings are 
often used to induce conformity to a set of normative expectations that are 
rooted in a dominant – yet contingent – worldview and culture. As Patricia 
Williams argues, these dominant understandings of the self and community 
tend to impose a “corporate group identity” which stifles autonomy, difference 
and individual experimentation.201
Recognising the constitutive role of culture, religion and community in the 
formation of individual identity can thus enhance equality and freedom by 
providing greater space for marginal cultures, religions and worldviews; by 
challenging the privileged position of a particular understanding of the self 
and of its place in the universe; and by expanding the scope for individual 
experimentation. It is therefore perfectly consistent with the inherent dignity 
of the person. The Court’s dignity-based interpretation of fundamental rights 
and freedoms is, however, far less accommodating of strong claims for group 
autonomy which rest upon a thick conception of group identity, and which 
197 See S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC), 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) paras 223-225, 307-308; Hoffmann v South 
African Airways 2000 11 BCLR 1211 (CC) para 38; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 
1 SA 217 (CC), 2004 12 BCLR 1268 (CC) para 37; Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC), 2007 1 BCLR 
1 (CC) paras 68-69, 112-120; Union of Refugee Women v Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory 
Authority 2007 4 SA 395 (CC), 2007 4 BCLR 339 (CC) 382D-H
198 See English “Ubuntu: The Quest for an Indigenous Jurisprudence” 1996 SAJHR 641; Van der Walt Law 
and Sacrifice: Towards a Post-Apartheid Theory of Law (2005) 109-115
199 Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 2001 2 SA 388 (CC), 2001 2 BCLR 133 
(CC) para 156
200 See eg Cornell 2004 SA Public Law 666; Bohler-Muller “The Story of an African Value” 2005 SA Public 
Law 266
201 “Metro Broadcasting, Inc v FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times” in Crenshaw, Gotanda, Peller & Thomas 
(eds) Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that formed the Movement (1995) 191 194
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assert the precedence of collective identities over individual rights.202 Such 
claims tend to frustrate challenges from within the group to dominant con-
structions of communal norms, deny the capacity of cultures to transform 
themselves, and lock their members into a particular way of life. They are 
also likely to entrench the material disadvantage and inferior social status of 
vulnerable subgroups and stifle individual autonomy and experimentation.203
A recent judgment of South Africa’s Constitutional Court dealing with reli-
gious and cultural diversity illustrates the Court’s use of dignity to avoid both 
the radical individualist conception of a self that is unencumbered by social 
ties and relations, and a thick, essentialist view of a self that is incapable of 
escaping the strictures imposed by attributes like culture and religion. MEC 
for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay204 concerned a school rule prohibit-
ing the wearing of jewellery. The Constitutional Court dismissed an appeal 
against the finding of the High Court that the school’s failure to permit a 
learner to wear a nose stud constituted unfair discrimination. The learner in 
question wore the nose stud as an expression of her South Indian Tamil Hindu 
culture. In his judgment, Langa CJ noted the “importance of community to 
individual identity and hence to human dignity”.205 He was, however, quick to 
point out that, far from being monolithic, cultures are
“living and contested formations. The protection of the Constitution extends to all those for whom 
culture gives meaning, not only to those who happen to speak with the most powerful voice in the 
present cultural conversation.”206
He rejected, moreover, the argument that a learner could not claim an 
exemption based on voluntary, as opposed to mandatory, cultural and religious 
practices. Having pointed out that dignity demands respect for the unique set 
of ends of every individual, he stated:
“That we choose voluntarily rather than through a feeling of obligation only enhances the significance 
of a practice to our autonomy, our identity and our dignity.”207
202 See eg Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC), 2000 10 BCLR 
1051 (CC) (ban on corporal punishments in independent schools found not to constitute an impermissible 
limitation on freedom of religion); Bhe v Magistrate Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; SA Human Rights 
Commission v President of the RSA, 2005 1 SA 563 (CC), 2005 1 BCLR 1 (CC) (customary law rule of 
male primogeniture found to violate constitutional rights of equality and dignity)  See also NM v Smith 
2007 5 SA 250 (CC), 2007 7 BCLR 751 (CC):
   “Underlying our Constitution is a recognition that, although as human beings we live in a community 
and are in a real sense both constituted by and constitutive of that community, we are nevertheless 
entitled to a personal sphere from which we may and do exclude that community” (para 130)
203 See Fraser “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation” 
in Fraser & Honneth (eds) Redistribution or Recognition? (2003) 76
204 2008 1 SA 474 (CC), 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC)
205 Para 53
206 Para 54  In her dissenting judgment, O’Regan J rejected the majority’s approach as too individualised 
and subjective  In her view, it is not enough to establish whether a particular belief is held sincerely  
Since cultures are associative, it needs to be asked “what the cultural community considers to be a 
cultural practice” (para 154 and see also paras 152-153)  She did, however, add that cultures “are not 
generally unified and coherent but are dynamic and often contested” (para 154)  Although her approach 
insists on the need for a shared understanding that a particular practice is a cultural practice and not 
merely a personal habit, it is not premised on the idea of a single authoritative interpretation of any 
given culture  
207 Para 64
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The judgment, while recognising the centrality of culture and belief to the 
dignity and identity of the human person, thus refuses to block out the voices 
of individual members in favour of a single, supposedly authoritative interpre-
tation of cultural practices and religious beliefs.
4 3 4 Theoretical orientations
The philosophical foundations of human dignity are not as fiercely con-
tested in the South African as in the German constitutional literature, and 
theoretical differences are less pronounced. Different theoretical orientations 
can nevertheless be identified. These orientations are generally presented as 
mutually reinforcing, rather than mutually exclusive.
The influence of Kant’s categorical imperative, in terms of which persons 
must always be treated as ends in themselves rather than as a means to 
an end, is evident from the courts’ use of the object formulation and from 
judgments which stress the right of the individual freely to choose her own 
ends.208 Woolman reads the Constitutional Court’s dignity jurisprudence as 
an elaboration on a few basic Kantian themes. He distils five definitions of 
dignity from the Court’s jurisprudence, each of which corresponds to different 
strands of Kantian moral thought. First, the individual should always be treated 
as an end in herself which should not be objectified or instrumentalised. 
Secondly, all individuals are entitled to equal concern and equal respect. 
Thirdly, individuals have the right to a space for self-actualisation. Fourthly, 
individuals are entitled to self-governance and have the right to participate in 
collective decision-making processes. And fifthly, dignity requires collective 
responsibility for the material conditions of individual agency.209
Although Kant’s moral thought provides the basic philosophical orientation 
for conceptualising dignity, other philosophies and outlooks are also influen-
tial. The Constitutional Court has found on a number of occasions that laws 
or conduct which contribute to the stigmatisation of particular social groups, 
are based on demeaning stereotypes or deny the social citizenship of certain 
categories of people, constitute a violation of their dignity and equality. For 
instance, a criminal ban on gay sodomy was found to stigmatise, degrade and 
devalue gay men, and to build insecurity and vulnerability into their daily 
lives.210 This amounted to a denial of the recognition of the equal and inher-
ent worth of gay men, which was harmful to their personal confidence and 
self-esteem and effectively conditioned their participation in public life on the 
suppression of a vital aspect of their identity. In the words of Sachs J:
“In the case of gays, history and experience teach us that the scarring comes not from poverty or 
powerlessness, but from invisibility. It is the tainting of desire, it is the attribution of perversity and 
shame to spontaneous bodily affection, it is the prohibition of the expression of love, it is the denial 
208 See 4 3 2 above and 4 4 1 below  See also Ackermann 2000 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 
540-542; Cornell 2004 SA Public Law 666-668
209 Woolman “Dignity” in Constitutional Law of SA 36-6–36-19
210 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC), 1998 12 BCLR 
1517 (CC) paras 23-28
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of full moral citizenship in society because you are what you are, that impinges on the dignity and 
self-worth of a group.”211
Consider also Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality 
Project v Minister of Home Affairs,212 which held that the exclusion of same-
sex unions from the definition of marriage violated the dignity and equality of 
gays and lesbians. The exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry 
stigmatised gays and lesbians as less capable of forming enduring and mean-
ingful intimate relationships and of assuming the responsibilities of marriage. 
At issue, in the view of the Court, was not simply the right of gays and lesbians 
to be left alone, but the right to equal public recognition of their identities and 
relationships213 and the fostering of an active citizenship which is based upon 
respect for difference.214
While these judgments resonate with a Kantian understanding of the inher-
ent dignity and worth of autonomous human beings, they also introduce a 
different dimension. Recognising that our personhood is grounded in mutual 
recognition, they demand a space in which individuals are free to forge their 
identities and a public sphere characterised by a plurality of perspectives and 
subject positions. Members of marginal and vulnerable groups need to be 
protected against officially sanctioned stigma and prejudice, which diminish 
their sense of self-worth and thus impede their capacity for self-realisation. 
Because a person’s agency and sense of self-worth are intimately bound up 
with recognition of her status as a free and equal member of society,215 dignity, 
in this view, precludes laws and official conduct which perpetuate harmful 
stereotypes about a particular group or category of persons.216 Dignity is 
violated where the law endorses cultural beliefs and social stereotypes which 
are premised on the inferiority of blacks, gays, women and other vulnerable 
groups. Such laws are harmful to the confidence and self-esteem of members 
of the stigmatised groups, and inhibit them in their roles as citizens, lovers, 
spouses, parents, workers, entrepreneurs, and so forth. Dignity, in short, is 
identified with the politics of recognition – giving the basic Kantian philo-
sophical orientation a distinctly Hegelian twist.217
211 Para 127
212 2006 1 SA 524 (CC), 2006 3 BCLR 355 (CC)
213 Para 78  
214 Para 60
215 Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC), 2002 8 BCLR 771 (CC) para 27 (human dignity includes 
both the “individual’s sense of self-worth” and “the public’s estimation of the worth or value of an 
individual”)
216 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC), 2004 11 BCLR 1125 (CC) para 116
217 Drawing on the philosophy of Hegel and on insights gained from psychological studies, Axel Honneth 
identifies three independent modes of recognition which correspond to three distinct types of moral 
harm  The first relates to the recognition of an individual’s needs and desires and finds expression in 
an intimate sphere of love and care  The second consists of the moral respect and equal treatment which 
is due to every person as a morally accountable human being  The third relates to social esteem and, 
in capitalist societies, is closely tied up with assessments of individual achievement and merit within a 
system of capitalist production  Honneth “Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy Fraser” 
in Fraser and Honneth (eds) Redistribution or Recognition? (2003) 110 138-150; Honneth Disrespect: the 
Normative Foundations of Critical Theory (2007) 129-143  See also Taylor “The Politics of Recognition” 
in Gutmann (ed) Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (1994) 25
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A third approach draws upon the works of Martha Nussbaum and Amartya 
Sen to argue that respect for dignity requires society to create the material 
conditions needed to enable persons to develop and exercise their capabili-
ties.218 This approach makes sense of the link made by the Constitutional 
Court in Grootboom and other cases between the deprivation of basic material 
needs and the impairment of a person’s human dignity.219 It also resonates 
with Kantian moral philosophy, as it is presumably far easier for individuals 
who lack support for the development of human capabilities to be reduced 
to instruments of the will of others. The capabilities approach has, however, 
been criticised for its tendency to suggest that persons who are denied certain 
conditions lack human dignity.220
4 3 5 Bearers of dignity
Dignity vests in every person and cannot be lost through crime or undigni-
fied behaviour.221 It extends to everyone within the national territory, and is 
not confined to citizens.222 While juristic persons are not bearers of dignity, 
they can claim certain rights closely connected to it, such as privacy. However, 
their privacy rights are not as intense as those of human beings.223
The dignity and right to life of the unborn foetus is not recognised in South 
African law. In Christian Lawyers Association of SA v Minister of Health,224 it 
was held that the foetus is not a legal persona under the Constitution and that 
it does not enjoy the right to life. McCreath J pointed out that the Constitution 
makes no express provision for the rights of the unborn child. Moreover, the 
right conferred by section 12(2) to make decisions concerning reproduc-
tion and to security in and control over one’s body is textually unqualified. 
Although he referred to the two abortion judgments of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, he presented them as products of Germany’s unique his-
tory, reflecting “the reaction against the contempt for individual life displayed 
218 Liebenberg “The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-Economic Rights” 2005 SAJHR 1; 
Woolman “Dignity” in Constitutional Law of SA 36-16–36-17, 36-65–36-70
219 See eg Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC), 2000 11 BCLR 1169 
(CC) paras 23, 44, 83
220 Cornell 2004 SA Public Law 667-668  Cornell is critical of attempts to justify socio-economic rights with 
reference to the Kantian notion of human dignity  See also Van Marle “ ‘The Capabilities Approach’, ‘the 
Imaginary Domain’, and ‘Asymmetrical Reciprocity’: Feminist Perspectives on Equality and Justice” 
2003 Feminist Legal Studies 255
221 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC), 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) paras 137 (dignity vests in “every person, 
including criminals convicted of vile crimes”), 142-143; August v Electoral Commission 1999 3 SA 1 
(CC), 1999 4 BCLR 363 (CC) para 18 (prisoners are not stripped of their dignity); Jordan v S 2002 6 SA 
642 (CC), 2002 11 BCLR 1117 (CC) para 74 (despite finding that invasion of prostitutes’ dignity is a result 
of their own conduct, rather than of the impugned law, held that they must be treated with dignity by the 
police and their customers)
222 Minister of Home Affairs v Watchenuka 2004 4 SA 326 (SCA), 2004 2 BCLR 120 (SCA) para 25:
   “Human dignity has no nationality  It is inherent in all people – citizens and non-citizens alike – simply 
because they are human ”
223 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd 2000 10 
BCLR 1079 (CC) para 18
224 1998 4 SA 113 (T), 1998 11 BCLR 1434 (T)
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in the Nazi period” and the influence of Catholic natural law in the constitu-
tion-making process.225 While this judgment makes sense of the prominence 
afforded in the 1996 Constitution to reproductive freedom,226 it can be faulted 
for its formalism and its refusal to engage fundamental ethical issues raised 
by the legalisation of abortion.
It is uncertain whether dignity extends to the deceased. In Nkosi v 
Bührmann,227 a case in which occupiers of land claimed the right to bury 
their dead on the land without the owner’s consent, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal mooted the possibility that the appellants could rely on the dignity 
of the deceased. The Court stated that “[funeral] and burial rituals, after all, 
serve to express final acknowledgment by the bereaved of the human dignity 
of the deceased.”228 Despite finding that the dignity of the deceased does not 
grant a right to burial without the owner’s consent, this judgment nevertheless 
seems to suggest that there are instances in which a person’s dignity might 
receive posthumous protection.229
Although the individual person is the bearer of human dignity, the 
Constitutional Court has on a few occasions invoked the dignity of the broader 
community. In Makwanyane the idea was mooted that it is not only the dignity 
of the person to be executed which is violated, but that the dignity of everyone 
in society may be invaded by the deliberate killing of a human being.230 In 
Port Elizabeth Municipality it was similarly argued that “society as a whole is 
demeaned” when government action denies the basic needs of the desperately 
poor.231 These judgments tie the dignity of poor and marginalised sections 
of the population to the dignity of everyone in society. This does not amount 
to the subordination of the inherent worth and dignity of the individual to 
notions of “collective” dignity, but rests instead upon the identification of the 
dignity of the individual with a Kantian “realm of ends” in which everyone’s 
dignity is recognised.232
225 1445I-1146A
226 See also Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health 2005 1 SA 509 (T), 2004 10 BCLR 1086 
(T) (upholding constitutionality of provisions in the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 
which allow women under the age of eighteen to have their pregnancies terminated without parental 
consent or control)
227 2002 1 SA 372 (SCA), 2002 6 BCLR 574 (SCA)
228 Para 55
229 But see S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC), 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) para 26 (death “puts an end not only 
to the right of life itself, but to all other personal rights which had vested in the deceased” under the Bill 
of Rights); S v Walters 2001 2 SACR 471 (Tk), 2001 10 BCLR 1088 (Tk) para 27 (while the deceased may 
be entitled to “the integrity and dignity of the dead”, such rights are not constitutional in nature); Minister 
of Education v Syfrets Trust Ltd NO 2006 4 SA 205 (C), 2006 10 BCLR 1214 (C) para 41 (leaving open the 
question whether the rights to human dignity and freedom can be invoked on behalf of the testator, who 
was dead)  See also Stanfield v Minister of Correctional Services 2004 4 SA 43 (C), 2003 12 BCLR 1384 
(C) para 128 (right to a humane and dignified death)
230 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC), 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) para 272
231 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC), 2004 12 BCLR 1268 (CC) para 18  
Cf also Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minster of Social Development 2004 6 SA 
505 (CC), 2004 6 BCLR 569 (CC) para 74:
   “Sharing responsibility for the problems and consequences of poverty equally as a community repre-
sents the extent to which wealthier members of the community view the minimal well-being of the poor 
as connected with their personal well-being and the well-being of the community as a whole”
232 See Woolman “Dignity” in Constitutional Law of SA 36-16
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4 4  Dignity in relation to other values
4 4 1  Freedom
South African courts have struggled to come to terms with dignity’s para-
doxical relationship to freedom. Whether dignity should, in a particular case, 
be used to enhance or restrict freedom has been the subject of much contro-
versy. In the early case of Ferreira v Levin NO and Vryenhoek v Powell NO,233 
the Constitutional Court split on the interpretation of the right to freedom and 
security of the person in terms of section 11(1) of the interim Constitution. 
Ackermann J found that the constitutional right to freedom and security of the 
person should be given a wide meaning to embrace the right of every person 
“not to have ‘obstacles to possible choices and activities’ placed in their way 
by ... the State”.234 He grounded his extensive interpretation of the right to 
freedom not only in freedom’s “intrinsic constitutional value”, but also in its 
proximity to the founding value of human dignity:
“An individual’s human dignity cannot be fully respected or valued unless the individual is permit-
ted to develop his or her unique talents optimally. Human dignity has little value without freedom; 
for without freedom personal development and fulfilment are not possible. Without freedom, human 
dignity is little more than an abstraction. Freedom and dignity are inseparably linked. To deny people 
their freedom is to deny them their dignity.”235
The majority opted instead for a narrower interpretation of the right. Its 
construction of section 11(1) rested inter alia on the fact that limitations of 
this right were required to be necessary, in addition to being reasonable. If 
the section were to be given a too extensive interpretation, courts would have 
to invalidate all regulatory laws which could not be justified as being neces-
sary in an open and democratic society. They would thus be required to sit 
in judgment on “what are essentially political decisions”236 and intrude into 
the functional sphere of the legislature. In this view, “human dignity can and 
will flourish without such an extensive interpretation being given to section 
11(1)”.237
In South Africa, as in Germany, dignity’s paradoxical relationship to 
freedom has come to the fore in cases in which individuals willingly partici-
pate in sexual acts which are viewed as degrading, demeaning or unnatural. 
Reference has been made above to cases in which dignity was invoked to 
justify restrictions on prostitution, bestiality and the possession of pornog-
raphy. These cases illustrate the dangers of relying on dignity to legitimate 
restrictions on sexual autonomy and choice.238
Contract is another area in which respect for individuals’ autonomous 
choices comes into conflict with the need to limit freedom in the interests of 
dignity and equality. South African courts tend to cling to an almost absolute 
conception of contractual freedom. Although it is accepted that a term in a 
233 1996 1 SA 984 (CC), 1996 1 BCLR 1 (CC)
234 Para 54
235 Para 49
236 Para 174
237 Para 173
238 See 4 3 2 above
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contract can be voided if it is against public policy, this has made no significant 
dent in the prevailing judicial ideology, which privileges the principles of con-
tractual autonomy and pacta sunt servanda over considerations of equity and 
fairness. Hopes that the constitutional values of dignity and equality might be 
used to set limits to contractual freedom have so far proved largely illusory. 
In fact, the Supreme Court of Appeal has invoked dignity to bolster the claims 
of contractual autonomy.239 And while it has been conceded that dignity and 
equality may have a role to play in trimming the excesses of contractual free-
dom240 – for instance, in cases of unequal bargaining power241 – the courts’ 
actual decisions show that the exercise of this power will be confined to such 
extreme cases that it is likely to have a minimal effect in combating inequality 
and protecting consumers.242
What is missing in these cases is a critical engagement with the social con-
text. Rather than situating their analysis within the context of vast inequalities 
of power and resources, South African courts have embraced a libertarian 
approach to contract which rests upon metaphysical notions of freedom. 
Human dignity, equality and freedom have been grounded in abstract notions 
which seem more at home in a nineteenth-century treatise than in a society 
trying to come to terms with a history of institutionalised inequality and dep-
rivation. The courts have thus missed a critical opportunity to situate their 
dignity analysis within the lived reality of ordinary South Africans.243
4 4 2  Equality
The Constitutional Court has placed dignity at the centre of the right to 
equality. Whether or not a particular law or conduct constitutes unfair 
discrimination is made to turn largely on the question whether it violates 
the complainants’ human dignity.244 Justifications for the dignity-based 
239 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA), 2002 12 BCLR 1229 (SCA) para 94 (“contractual autonomy is part 
of freedom  Shorn of its obscene excesses, contractual autonomy informs also the constitutional value of 
dignity”); Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 23
240 The best statement of this view is that of Davis J in Mort NO v Henry Shields-Chiat 2001 1 SA 464 (C)  
In his view, the values of equality and human dignity require
   “[parties] to a contract [to] adhere to a minimum threshold of mutual respect in which “the unreason-
able and one-sided promotion of one’s own interest at the expense of the other infringes the principle of 
good faith to such a degree as to outweigh the public interest in the sanctity of contracts” (475)  
241 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA); Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA), 2006 9 
BCLR 1011 (SCA) para 14
242 In Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA), a clause indemnifying a hospital against liability 
for the negligence of its staff was held not to be against public policy  
243 See the dissenting judgments of Moseneke DCJ and Sachs J in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC), 
2007 7 BCLR 691 (CC) for examples of an approach which is far more alive to the South African context 
of unequal power relations  See also Bhana & Pieterse “Towards a Reconciliation of Contract Law and 
Constitutional Values: Brisley and Afrox Revisited” 2005 SALJ 865; Sutherland “Ensuring Contractual 
Fairness in Consumer Contracts After Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC)” 2008 Stell LR 390; 2009 
Stell LR 50
244 Goldstone J proclaimed in President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC), 1997 6 
BCLR 708 (CC):
   “At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a recognition that the purpose of our new 
constitutional and democratic order is the establishment of a society in which all human beings will be 
accorded equal dignity and respect regardless of their membership of particular groups” (para 41)
 See also Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 3 SA 1012 (CC), 1997 6 BCLR 759 (CC) paras 31-33; Harksen v 
Lane NO 1998 1 SA 300 (CC), 1997 11 BCLR 1489 (CC) paras 46, 50, 51, 53, 91-92
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interpretation of the right to equality include the Court’s understanding that 
the evil of apartheid consisted first and foremost in a denial of the dignity 
of the majority of the population,245 the idea that equality is a comparative 
concept which has no substantive meaning on its own,246 and the idea that 
dignity provides a neutrally principled basis for the negotiation of conflicting 
constitutional goods, like equality and freedom.247
The Court’s dignity-based approach initially attracted considerable criticism. 
Some commentators argued that dignity is too individualistic to capture the 
groups-based nature of unfair discrimination, and proposed an alternative 
approach focusing on material disadvantage and structural discrimination.248 
Others claimed that dignity is indeterminate and can be manipulated to reach 
almost any outcome.249 However, these criticisms were subsequently toned 
down as a result of a number of developments. First, the Court’s dignity-based 
approach soon proved to be a powerful weapon in the struggles of gays, 
non-citizens, religious minorities and other vulnerable groups against their 
continued marginalisation. Gays and lesbians, in particular, scored important 
victories, including the recognition of same-sex marriage.250 Secondly, the 
Court’s dignity-based approach came to be identified with a judicial philosophy 
which celebrates difference. Respect for dignity, in this view, demands respect 
for the multiple and divergent cultures, religions, sexual orientations, family 
formations, worldviews and narratives which constitute each individual as 
unique, and precludes the conflation of equality with the homogenisation of 
beliefs and behaviour.251 Thirdly, the alliance between dignity and equality 
proved capable of challenging at least some forms of material disadvantage, 
as is evident, inter alia, from cases in which the exclusion of certain groups or 
categories of persons from welfare programmes, housing plans and statutory 
benefits was successfully challenged.252
Today, most commentators agree that the dignity-based approach has, on 
balance, generated a perceptive form of equality analysis that is sensitive 
to context and has resulted in important advances for equality. There are, 
however, judgments in which the Constitutional Court has been insufficiently 
attentive to structural disadvantage; has relied on conservative assumptions 
about choice, consent, marriage and the family; or has failed to have proper 
245 Ackermann 2000 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 540-542
246 Ackermann “Equality and Non-Discrimination: some Analytical Thoughts” 2006 SAJHR 597; Cowen 
“Can ‘Dignity’ guide South Africa’s Equality Jurisprudence?” 2001 SAJHR 34 48
247 Ackermann 2000 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 554-556
248 Albertyn & Goldblatt “Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the Development of an 
Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality” 1998 SAJHR 248
249 Davis 1999 SALJ 398
250 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 3 
BCLR 355 (CC), 2006 1 SA 524 (CC).
251 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC), 1998 12 BCLR 
1517 (CC) paras 22, 134; Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister 
of Home Affairs 2006 3 BCLR 355 (CC), 2006 1 SA 524 (CC) paras 60, 61; MEC for Education: KwaZulu-
Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC), 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC) paras 65
252 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC), 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) 
(state’s failure to provide for housing needs of those in desperate need found to be unreasonable); Khosa v 
Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minster of Social Development 2004 6 SA 505 (CC), 2004 6 
BCLR 569 (CC) (exclusion of permanent residents from social security benefits found unconstitutional)
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regard to plurality and difference.253 Even some of its more progressive equal-
ity judgments seem to have modelled citizenship and difference on an idealised 
vision of the outsider who, in the end, is made to bear an uncanny resemblance 
to ourselves.254 These judgments have sparked debates over the possibilities 
and limits of dignity-based equality analysis. It has been suggested that there 
may be subtle forms of discrimination which are not easily captured in the 
language of dignity, particularly in cases where such discrimination results 
from the interplay between supposedly neutral legal norms, material depriva-
tion and societal prejudice. The debate, it seems, no longer focuses on the 
question whether or not to rely on dignity, but rather on the contexts in which 
different modes of analysis work best, and on the complex interplay between 
recognition and redistribution, between dignity and systemic discrimination, 
and between equality, diversity and participation.255
4 4 3  Democracy
Relying on the value of human dignity, the Constitutional Court has, in 
some cases, articulated an understanding of democracy which embraces 
the right of citizens, including minorities, to participate in decision-making 
processes which affect them. At the same time, the Court’s understanding of 
dignity has been infused with the democratic values of citizenship, diversity 
and participation. The Court struck down the disenfranchisement of prisoners 
on two separate occasions. Insisting that “the vote of each and every citizen is 
a badge of dignity and of personhood”,256 it affirmed the connection between 
dignity and our membership of the political community. It is, however, clear 
that citizenship is not understood in a strictly formal sense. The Court has 
invalidated a number of measures which denied the moral or social citizenship 
of gays, lesbians and other vulnerable categories of persons. The Constitution, 
in its view, not only regards formal restrictions on citizenship and the right to 
vote with the utmost suspicion, but also requires close scrutiny of measures 
which unduly inhibit the participation of vulnerable groups in public life.257
In the view of the Court, respect for everyone’s dignity and moral citizen-
ship also requires consultative and participatory processes in which those 
affected are given the opportunity to voice their concerns and to participate in 
the search for an accommodation of conflicting rights and interests. The Court 
has, for instance, required the state to engage meaningfully with occupiers 
253 Some of the most controversial judgments include Harksen v Lane NO 1998 1 SA 300 (CC), 1997 11 
BCLR 1489 (CC); Jordan v S 2002 6 SA 642 (CC), 2002 11 BCLR 1117 (CC); Volks NO v Robinson 
2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC); and Union of Refugee Women v Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory 
Authority 2007 4 SA 395 (CC), 2007 4 BCLR 339 (CC)
254 See Robson “Sexual Democracy” 2007 SAJHR 409; De Vos “The ‘Inevitability’ of Same-Sex Marriage 
in South Africa’s Post-Apartheid State” 2007 SAJHR 432
255 See Botha “Equality, Dignity, and the Politics of Interpretation” 2004 SA Public Law 724; Albertyn 
“Substantive Equality and Transformation in South Africa” 2007 SAJHR 253; Van Marle “Haunting 
(In)Equalities” in Hunter (ed) Rethinking Equality Projects in Law: Feminist Challenges (2008); Botha 
“Equality, Plurality, and Structural Power” 2008 SAJHR (forthcoming)
256 August v Electoral Commission 1999 3 SA 1 (CC), 1999 4 BCLR 363 (CC) para 17; Minister of Home 
Affairs v NICRO 2004 5 BCLR 445 (CC) para 28
257 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC), 1998 12 BCLR 
1517 (CC) para 127
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against whom an eviction order is sought, stating that the occupiers must be 
treated as “individual [bearers] of rights entitled to respect for [their] dignity”, 
rather than as “faceless and anonymous squatters automatically to be expelled 
as obnoxious social nuisances”.258 It has also emphasised the importance of 
consultation and dialogue in mediating and accommodating religious and 
cultural difference. Parties to a dispute are required to engage in a “reasonable 
accommodation of interests”. This presupposes mutual recognition, a willing-
ness to engage in dialogue, the right of religious and cultural minorities to 
participate in decision-making processes, and the responsibility of the courts 
to intervene in cases in which public authorities have not gone far enough in 
accommodating minority viewpoints and practices.259
4 5  Limitation
Dignity has emerged as the primary mechanism by means of which the 
Court has attempted to mediate value conflicts. The notion of dignity is 
central to the proportionality inquiry and balancing undertaken by the Court 
in terms of the general limitation clause. Guided by the value of human 
dignity, the Court has, for instance, construed the right to privacy in terms of 
three core areas: personal space, intimate personal relations and the right to 
an autonomous identity. The closer a limitation of privacy comes to the core 
of a person’s fundamental human dignity, the more persuasive the justification 
of the limitation is required to be. Conversely, more leeway is given to the 
legislature to limit privacy in areas which are further removed from the core 
of dignity, autonomy and identity.260 Rather than positing a categorical ban on 
the limitation of dignity, this approach is sensitive to differences of degree. 
Limitations which go to the heart of the individual’s inherent dignity and 
worth would seldom pass constitutional muster, while limitations are allowed 
more readily in the case of marginal infringements.
The idea of dignity as a device which enables the principled mediation of 
conflicting constitutional values is not without problems.261 The first difficulty 
is that of distinguishing between a core of human dignity, the limitation of 
which must meet the most stringent standards of justification, and penumbral 
258 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC), 2004 12 BCLR 1268 (CC) para 41  
See also paras 39-47 (extolling the virtues of compulsory mediation in trying to resolve disputes about 
evictions); Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC), 2000 11 BCLR 
1169 (CC) paras 83-84, 88; Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township v City of Johannesburg 2008 5 
BCLR 475 (CC) paras 9-23 (giving reasons for the Court’s earlier interim order which required that the 
parties first engage with each other and report back to the Court on the outcome of their engagement, and 
insisting that the absence of meaningful engagement would ordinarily weigh heavily against granting an 
ejectment order)
259 See Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 2002 2 SA 794 (CC), 2002 3 BCLR 
231 (CC) paras 146-149, 155-156, 162, 170; MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 
(CC), 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC) paras 71-83, 174, 177, 182  
260 Bernstein v Bester 1996 2 SA 751 (CC), 1996 4 BCLR 449 (CC) paras 65-67, 77, 79-80, 85, 90; Investigating 
Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd 2000 10 BCLR 1079 
(CC) para 18; NM v Smith (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2007 5 SA 250 (CC), 2007 
7 BCLR 751 (CC) para 136
261 See Woolman & Botha “Limitations” in Woolman, Roux, Klaaren, Stein & Chaskalson (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa 2 ed (2006) 34-116–34-121 for a critical analysis of the Court’s use of dignity in its 
proportionality analysis
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areas where the individual’s rights might more easily yield to countervailing 
interests. Although certain general guidelines can be laid down (for instance, 
it appears as if the right not to be reduced to a mere object belongs to the 
very heart of the dignity guarantee, whereas the right to personal reputation is 
further removed from the core of human dignity and is therefore more open to 
balancing), they must of necessity remain rather vague, and much depends on 
the court’s characterisation of the interests at stake.
A second problem has been that the distinction between core and peripheral 
areas lends itself to conservative assumptions about choice, marriage and 
sexual intimacy. It has, for instance, been held that the stigma suffered by 
prostitutes is a result of their own choice, rather than being directly related 
to the role of the law in reinforcing structural disadvantage and harmful 
stereotypes.262 The diminished protection granted to intimate relations that 
do not conform to an idealised model of heterosexual marriage also falls into 
this category.263
A third problem is that there are certain intractable conflicts in which dignity 
appears on both sides of the dispute, in which it is by no means obvious that 
the one side’s dignity interest is relatively stronger than that of the other. For 
instance, associative practices which are constitutive of the identity and self-
understanding of members of religious or cultural communities may clash 
with the claims to equal respect of insiders (eg women) who claim that these 
practices impair their autonomy and equality. In such cases, dignity seems to 
be incapable of providing a neutrally principled basis for balancing equality 
and freedom. These cases also point to the limits of the idea of a reasonable 
accommodation of interests – sometimes one constitutionally protected 
interest must simply give way to another.264
Finally, even a severe limitation which goes to the heart of human dignity 
can, in principle, be justified in terms of pressing social needs. For instance, 
despite the Court’s finding in S v Makwanyane265 that capital punishment 
annihilates human dignity, the finding of unconstitutionality ultimately 
turned on the state’s failure to demonstrate that the death penalty deters 
violent crime. A different outcome might have been reached if only the state 
successfully crossed that hurdle. While making it more difficult to justify 
serious violations of dignity, this approach does not provide an absolute shield 
against justifying violations of core areas of human dignity in the name of 
utilitarian considerations.266
262 Jordan v S 2002 6 SA 642 (CC), 2002 11 BCLR 1117 (CC) paras 16, 74
263 Volks NO v Robinson 2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC) (exclusion of permanent life partners from benefits under 
the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 held not to infringe their rights to equality and 
dignity)  
264 Eg in Bhe v Magistrate Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; SA Human Rights Commission v President of the RSA 
2005 1 SA 563 (CC), 2005 1 BCLR 1 (CC) the majority declined to develop customary law in line with 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights and simply invalidated the customary-law rule of male 
primogeniture  But see also the dissent of Ngcobo J paras 212-222
265 1995 3 SA 391 (CC), 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC)
266 See Van der Walt Law and Sacrifice 106-109 (criticizing the Court in Makwanyane for its consequential-
ist reasoning)
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5  Concluding remarks
This article started by noting that dignity is often invoked as a supreme 
value, an interpretive Leitmotiv, a basis for the limitation of rights and 
freedoms, and a guide to the principled resolution of constitutional value 
conflicts. This is not only the case in South Africa, but also in other national 
jurisdictions. However, the idea of dignity as a commanding constitutional 
norm and value which enables us to negotiate fundamental value conflicts in a 
principled manner is, at least in the view of some scholars, rendered problem-
atic by the elusiveness of the term. Dignity is notoriously difficult to define. 
It is a rich and complex concept which is closely connected to the ideals of 
human worth, autonomy, agency, equality, solidarity and difference. It has a 
rich and varied history, and our understanding of it is shaped as much by the 
history of multiple, horrific violations of the inherent dignity of the human 
person, as by the complex intellectual history of the idea. It is a norm which 
elicits almost universal consent, and yet attempts to define it with any degree 
of precision are bound to be frustrated by the indeterminacy of the concept 
and by philosophical and ideological disagreement. The disparate intellectual 
traditions that have helped shape contemporary notions of dignity, the remark-
able plasticity of the concept, and the difficulty of having to apply the abstract 
philosophical idea of dignity in concrete legal settings, raise questions over its 
capacity to guide and constrain constitutional argument.
One way of making sense of the primacy of dignity is by turning the debate 
on its head. Instead of asking whether the concept of dignity is stable enough 
to guide legal decision making, one might ask how our inability to come up 
with a single, comprehensive definition of dignity267 could facilitate reasoned 
constitutional debate over controversial social issues. Such an approach would 
avoid the kind of dichotomised thinking which assumes that legal meaning 
is either predetermined by legal materials, or is wholly unconstrained.268 
Holding open the possibility that dignity’s capacity to guide and constrain 
constitutional interpretation might be a function of its ambiguity or its para-
doxical nature, it could assist us in arriving at a more realistic assessment of 
the possibilities and limits of a dignity-based jurisprudence.
My analyses of the German and South African dignity jurisprudence point 
to a number of paradoxes which are inherent in the notion of dignity. In the 
first place, human dignity implies something inviolable; something which 
commands our highest respect regardless of the consequences; something 
which can neither be forfeited nor waived nor weighed up against clashing 
considerations. And yet, precisely because it is such a pervasive value which 
underlies a variety of rights, dignity cannot escape being subjected to balanc-
ing, thus subverting its claim to an absolute status.
267 The late Justice William J Brennan of the United States Supreme Court described attempts to devise a 
comprehensive definition of dignity as an “eternal quest”, thus suggesting that there is something about 
dignity which resists definitional closure  Brennan “The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary 
Ratification” 1985 Univ California Davis LR 8 12
268 Botha “Freedom and Constraint in Constitutional Adjudication” 2004 SAJHR 249
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The German Basic Law and the South African Constitution represent 
different ways of coming to terms with this paradox. The Basic Law protects 
dignity as something inviolable which is shielded absolutely from legislative 
incursion and constitutional amendment. The notion that dignity is not subject 
to balancing has, however, come under pressure and has in certain cases 
resulted in an overly restrictive interpretation of dignity. It has also raised 
fears that dignity might be used to forestall democratic debate on issues 
characterized by widespread and reasonable disagreement. The South African 
Constitution, on the other hand, does not insulate dignity from limitation. 
While this approach leads to fewer problems of categorisation and definition, 
there is a risk that dignity might become just one constitutional right and 
value among many, and that the inherent dignity and worth of the human 
person could be sacrificed in the name of countervailing interests.
The second paradox is closely related to the first. Dignity is seen as a mat-
ter of cosmopolitan right; something which is inherent in all human beings 
and transcends cultural barriers and national boundaries. And yet its protec-
tion depends, for the most part, on the nation state, and its precise meaning 
and contours are culturally mediated. This is true not only in the sense that 
there are severe forms of degradation which fall through the cracks separat-
ing national and international law,269 but it is also evident from the divergent 
approaches taken to dignity in different national systems. Consider, for 
instance, the articulation in Germany of the values of life and dignity, the 
protection given to the unborn and the prohibition of the instrumentalisation 
of human embryos. By contrast, the early link made in the South African 
context between life and dignity has remained wholly underdeveloped,270 and 
the recognition in Germany of the dignity of the unborn is often explained by 
South African lawyers as a uniquely German preoccupation which is rooted 
in Germany’s particular history. In South Africa, the most innovative uses of 
dignity have come from an exploration of the intersections of dignity, equality 
and difference. This serves once again to confirm the influence of contingent 
historical factors on the shape and content given to dignity within a particular 
legal system.
It is important to keep these tensions alive. We can never simply step 
outside the confines of the positive legal ordering or transcend the cultural 
and historical schemata through which our understandings of dignity are 
invariably filtered. At the same time, we need to remain open to the utopian 
possibilities inherent in the notion of an absolute and limitless human dignity. 
Only thus can we hope to push against the boundaries – whether geographical, 
cultural or ideological – which tend to legitimate and normalise degradation 
and inequality.
The third paradox concerns the idea of human dignity as something inherent 
in every human being. Dignity accrues to every human person, regardless 
of her material conditions or social standing. And yet, the equal respect 
and autonomy to which every person is entitled is contingent on mutual 
269 Cf Hofmann’s two examples cited in 3 3 4 above
270 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC), 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC).
218 STELL LR 2009 2
       
recognition within a community of equals271 and on the material conditions 
needed to enable individuals to develop their capabilities.272 While dignity 
requires us to challenge misrecognition and material deprivation, it is vital to 
avoid the conflation of human dignity with dignified economic conditions or 
social respect.273
The fourth paradox can be stated as follows: dignity demands respect for 
the familial ties, communal attachments, cultural meanings, religious beliefs 
and discursive practices through which we make sense of our world and forge 
our individual identities. It rejects the notion of the unencumbered self and 
recognises the formative role of – contingent – cultural value patterns and 
institutional arrangements on our sense of self. At the same time, however, 
respect for someone’s inherent dignity requires recognition of the person’s 
capacity to transcend the strictures of her social background and to forge an 
autonomous identity. I have attempted to show that, both in Germany and South 
Africa, the inherent dignity of each individual has been invoked to exclude 
both a radical, abstract individualism and a “thick” form of communitarian-
ism in which the collective takes precedence over the individual. Precisely 
because it values both the centrality of cultural practices, religious beliefs and 
communal ties to individual dignity and identity, and celebrates the capacity 
of the individual to transcend the strictures of her own background, dignity 
can be used to negotiate conflicts between the individual and community in 
a way which neither obliterates diversity nor stultifies the dynamic processes 
through which community norms are generated and contested.274
The fifth paradox, like the fourth, concerns the relationship between 
dignity, the individual and community. Dignity is closely related to personal 
freedom and presupposes the right of the individual freely to choose her own 
ends. At the same time, however, respect for dignity requires us to set limits 
to freedom – particularly in an age characterised by pervasive private power, 
excessive consumerism and deepening inequality.
Finally, dignity demands an impossible and unlimited responsibility to 
respect and protect everyone’s inherent dignity, regardless of national bound-
aries and countervailing rights and interests. At the same time, however, 
dignity requires meticulous attention to particular, local contexts. An under-
standing of dignity as something abstract and formal – like that informing 
South Africa’s law of contract – inevitably ends up as a caricature. It is only 
through careful attention to the particularity of human lives that we can keep 
interrogating concepts, rules and institutions – state sovereignty, the market, 
the public/private distinction, cultural value patterns, and so forth – which 
render degradation and abuse invisible and lend them an air of inevitability.
Perhaps, then, the capacity of dignity to guide and structure constitutional 
discourse lies in the way in which it suspends legal decision making between 
the universal and the particular, between the transcendental and the contingent. 
271 Cf the discussion of the communicative theory under 3 3 4, and of a recognition-based approach under 4 
3 4 above
272 Cf the discussion of the capabilities approach under 4 3 4 above
273 See Cornell 2004 SA Public Law 667-668
274 See 3 3 3 and 4 3 3 above
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Dignity demands unwavering commitment to the inviolability of each human 
person. And yet, it can only be honoured through careful engagement with the 
particularity of local contexts. Dignity requires respect for the constitutive 
role of culture, religion, family and community. At the same time, however, 
it insists on the capacity of individuals to transcend the strictures of their 
own background and helps facilitate the infusion of egalitarian norms into 
these spheres. Our understanding of dignity is inevitably filtered through 
contingent historical struggles and cultural understandings. And yet, the 
ideal of dignity demands openness to the human capacity for new beginnings 
and to an enlargement of our understanding of the meanings and bearers 
of dignity. Finally, dignity constrains legal meaning by excluding a range 
of interpretations which are incompatible with the inherent worth of the 
human person. At the same time, it institutes uncertainty by recognising each 
individual as a unique, self-legislating human being, who has the moral right 
to question received interpretations and to challenge the normative closure 
into which political communities invariably lapse.
SUMMARY
This article compares the role of human dignity in constitutional interpretation in Germany and 
South Africa. Both countries have embraced dignity as a direct response to a troubled and totalitarian 
past. Nowadays dignity features as a supreme value, an interpretive Leitmotiv, a justiciable right, an 
objective constitutional norm, and a guide to the resolution of value conflicts. There are, however, 
important differences in the way dignity has shaped these countries’ constitutional jurisprudence. A 
study of the relevant similarities and differences provides an important occasion for critical reflection 
on the possibilities and limits of a dignity-based jurisprudence. The article concludes with tentative 
observations on the capacity of dignity to guide constitutional decision-making.
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